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Article 8

Book Reviews

The Use and Abuse of History:
Recent Developments in Feminist Theory
Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England
by Mary Poovey. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. xi
$39.95, cloth; $14.95, paper.

+ 282.

"Am I that Name?": Feminism and the Category of ''Women'' in History by Denise Riley. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988. Pp. vi + 126. $29.95,
cloth; $12.95, paper.
Feminist Literary History by Janet Todd. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pp. 162.
$37.50, cloth; $12.95, paper.
Feminist scholarship has played a decisive part in the regeneration and expansion of historical studies in recent years, opening up rich and productive
areas of intellectual inquiry in literary, cultural and social history and in related disciplines and interdisciplinary fields. It is hardly coincidental that the
questioning of traditional conceptualizations and periodizations of the past
has intensified at the same time as this unprecedented expansion of women's
history, alongside a growing body of work on the history of racial, ethnic,
sexual and other minorities. Yet recentering history around women's lives
and experiences does not in itself resolve problems regarding the nature and
status of historical knowledge which have been raised by feminist theory.
Rather, it embroils the writer in new conceptual difficulties that are not
merely of esoteric interest but have direct consequences for her choice of
methodology and argument. Can women be conceptualized as an autonomous social group for the purposes of historical research? How does women's history affect existing models of periodization? What is the nature of the
relationship between "female" and "feminist" and to what extent is this relationship histOrically overdetermined? How is female agency to be conceptualized in examining the patriarchal social and ideological structures of the past?
These and related questions are addressed in the texts under review, which
are all concerned to argue the centrality of history to feminist literary and
cultural analysis. The directions and emphases of each author differ; Todd's
work offers a defence of a relatively traditional model of literary history,
while both Poovey and Riley draw on Foucaldian terminology to develop a
broader notion of the textual and of the discursive construction of gender. All
three works, however, defend the importance of a sociohistorically informed
approach to feminist issues and relate their theoretical concerns to the analysis of specific aspects of English society. Each text also argues that women's
history cannot be treated in isolation but that "woman" is a category which
is always overdetermined by multiple social and ideological factors. While it
would be incautious to generalize from such a limited sample, the texts under
review can perhaps be seen as symptomatic of an increasing body of feminist
work which is either abandoning or radically problematizing models of
sexual difference developed in psychoanalytical and deconstructive theory in
favor of more detailed and specific analyses of particular constructions of
femininity as shaped by multiple variables of historical and cultural background, of class, race and sexual preference.
Of course, the feminist interest in history has not remained untouched by
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critiques of historiography which have occurred both inside and outside of
feminism. In the context of an Anglo-American and largely empirical historical tradition, the impact of poststructuralist theories of the text has been twofold. With regard to the content or object of historical research, such theories
have encouraged much closer attention to symbolic systems of meaningculture, discourse, ideology, literature-in the study of the past. Second, at
the level of methodology, they have served to intensify awareness of the necessarily textual dimension of any process of historical reconstruction and of
the writer's own investment in the articulation of a particular conception of
the past. Poststructuralist theory has also influenced a European historiographical tradition implicit in much Marxist thinking about culture, a tradition which, while scornful of naive empiricism, has tended towards sweeping
and totalizing models of the historical process. Fredric jameson observes in
this context that "few enough of us are engaged any more in writing literary
history, at least of the narrative kind ... though we may think of doing criticism historically, which is a somewhat different matter.'" Although the complete excision of narrative from history may be neither possible nor desirable
(as jameson's own work clearly demonstrates), the specific field of literary
studies has indeed seen a shift away from an Auerbachian model of literary
history as a narrative account of the aesthetic masterpieces of Western civilisation. New forms of historical analysis often link literary and non-literary
texts, prefer detailed and small-scale studies to grand historical generalizations and stress the complex and contradictory relations between literary, cultural and social structures rather than reducing a text to an exemplary manifestation of a pre-existing Zeitgeist. The appeal to "history" signals in this
context a desire on the part of the writer to situate a text in relation to temporally specific and diverse social and cultural determinants governing its
production and/or reception, rather than invoking a pre-given consensus as
to the nature and meaning of historical processes. This question remains a
problematic and contested one-nowhere more clearly than in feminist analysis, which has developed diverse and often conflicting accounts of the status
and significance of history and processes of social change.
Through such earlier books as Women's Friendship in Literature and Sensibility: An Introduction, janet Todd has established herself as a significant
presence in feminist and eighteenth-century literary studies. Her new work
Feminist Literary History is presented as a defense of the claims of "history"
against theory-that is, as a validation of the feminist literary history practised by Elaine Showalter and others against the criticism it has received in
recent years from feminist theorists influenced by poststructuralism, such as
Toril Moi, Mary jacobus and Alice jardine. Todd forcefully criticizes what she
sees as the apoliticism and elitism implicit in dominant forms of French feminist theory, arguing that psychoanalysis in particular has proved itself of
questionable value in addressing the politics of literature and gender. Instead,
she advocates the practice of a "kind of historically specific, archival, ideologically aware but still empirically based enterprise, using a sense of specific
genre as well as notions of changing female experience" (p. 7). While defending the importance of a historical approach to women's experience Todd indicates some of the limitations of a "gynocritical" model of feminist literary
history grounded in a notion of women's literature as an autonomous tradil
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tion. Such a model, she suggests, is blind to the diverse ways in which women's cultural production is always influenced across gender lines, while simultaneously encouraging the critic to project her own interests unreflectingly onto the past, assuming a commonality of women's experiences that is
insufficiently sensitive to historical difference. Rather than being too historical, in other words, feminist literary history has not been historical enough,
and Todd argues for greater attention to empirical questions and archival
work as well as suggesting that American feminism could benefit from more
sustained engagement with the category of ideology which has been so important to English feminism.
A number of the claims advanced in Feminist Literary History are in my
opinion suggestive and potentially persuasive: the critique of the abstractness
and ahistoricism of much French feminist thought, Todd's advocacy of forms
of reading attentive to the strangeness and otherness of the past, her insistence that feminist literary theories need to pay much more attention to the
status and significance of genre. Yet such points remain for the most part
schematic and are not developed in terms of a sustained argument or conceptual framework. In her introduction, Todd states that the text is not intended
as an introductory guide to feminist criticism; its discussions of particular critics are sketchy rather expository and Todd does not make any claims to offer
a systematic coverage of the field. Yet as a theoretical intervention and critique the work is disappointing. It offers unnecessary background detail already familiar to anyone working in feminist criticism and ranges across a
variety of disparate issues-the feminist anthology, readings of Mary Wollstonecraft, "men in feminism" and male homosexuality-without offering
any adequate clarification of the project of a "feminist literary history," at a
time when all these terms have been called into question. Todd does not for
example discuss in any detail her understanding of the status of "literature"
and its relationship to ideolOgical and social structures, except to criticize the
traditional canon. Such an account of the specificity and significance of the
literary text would have been helpful in justifying her desire to defend an
idea of literary history against the current trend towards broader notions of
the cultural text (new historicism, an obvious context for such a discussion,
merits only a very token reference.) Even more glaring is the absence of any
systematic engagement with the problem of "history." Clearly, the mere
evocation of the term cannot provide a solution to the problems of textual interpretation, but merely raises new questions as to the interpretative framework governing the theorist's conception of the nature and meanings of historical processes. It is precisely feminist analysis which has in recent years reemphasized that any construction of history is always partial and based on a
selective reading of disparate social and cultural phenomena. This acknowledgment of the inescapable hermeneutic dimension of historical understanding does not automatically imply, as Todd seems to fear, that history is
thereby reduced to nothing more that a indiscriminate plurality of competing
fictions whose truth status cannot be meaningfully subjected to any form of
empirical verification. It does, however, place the onus on the theorist to
spell out the assumptions underlying her particular conception of history, assumptions which in tum imply a specific politics and a social theory, however inchoate, of the nature and causes of historical change. Todd's own un-
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derstanding of history appears to owe little to either Marx or Foucault, and
she is explicitly critical of the teleological narratives which she identifies in
the work of feminist literary historians such as Showalter, yet the nature of
her own conception of history, of the status of the female subject, and of the
social functions of literary texts is never rendered explicit.
No feminist theorist seems to deserve Todd's unconditional approval; she
snipes at almost every critic she discusses, often for very odd reasons (Showalter, for example, is admonished for using too many metaphors, as well as
for "dabbling in translated language"). While critical of the abstractness of
much French theory, Todd's own text is often equally sweeping, relying on
generalizations and emotive judgments. For example, she argues that psychoanalytical criticism "seems to grow supremely arrogant, knowing its own
primacy to the literature it envelops'. .. at the same time, it shores up the
project of traditional criticism and takes part in the constant evasive and ultimately conservative working over of canonical texts" (p. 15). Discussing
more subjective feminist American criticism, Todd is equally censorious:
"During the whole of the 1970s dislike of male scholarship, logic and authority made some American criticism over personal, gushing and woolly"{p. 37).
Much of the text is written in this casual, journalistic and judgmental style,
and Feminist Literary History relies heavily on a brisk ideology of common
sense. Recent critiques of subjectivity, reason or history appear in this context
as the modish but ultimately silly outpourings of a few Parisian eccentrics
rather than as part of a longstanding and complex, if politically ambiguous,
philosophical tradition of critical engagement with the legacy of the Enlightenment.
The text gives the impression of having been hastily written; Todd's phrasing is often awkward or unclear and links between chapters or chapter sections appear intuitive rather than systematic. Todd's choice of this kind of
more informal and essayistic approach is undoubtedly related to her insistence on the elitism of theory and her irritation with feminist intellectuals insufficiently attuned to the politics of the women's movement outside the
academy. I would certainly agree with what I take to be Todd's basic point
that feminism has failed to engage in any systematic and critical fashion with
the (ambiguous) political implications of its own specialization and institutionalization within the university. Yet to refuse difficult theoretical work on
such grounds is to risk an anti-intellectualist stance blind to the potentially
emancipatory and critical dimension of theory as a means of interrogating
commonly held assumptions and challenging simplistic dogmas, feminist or
otherwise. It is all the more questionable in that Todd does not address the
politics of her own institutional position, except to position herself as a victim
by asserting her own "marginality," offering as evidence the hostile reviews
of her books in the Times Literary Supplement. For a senior and much published Cambridge academic to make such claims in a seemingly unproblematical fashion merely confirms the poststructuralist insight that the process
of autobiographical self-authentication may engender obfuscation rather than
insight, in this case an apparent blindness to the privileges accruing from
class and cultural capital.
Following on from her earlier work on ideologies of femininity in the texts
of Austen and Wollstonecraft, Mary Poovey's new book Uneven Develop-

Criticism, Vol. XXXI, No.4: Book Reviews

459

ments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England, offers a carefully documented analysis of the cultural construction of gender in England
in the 1840s and 50s. Her object of study includes not only literature, but
also a variety of other cultural texts which simultaneously expressed and
shaped contemporary thinking about femininity: letters, periodicals, legal and
medical texts. By drawing on the notion of a "symbolic economy," Poovey is
able to move beyond the limiting conception of an autonomous "text" reflecting or subverting an unproblematically given "context" to examine the
ideological conditions underpinning a variety of Victorian cultural practices.
Poovey's basic thesis is that Victorian culture sought to conceptualize difference in terms of a binary polarity of gender, and that this vision of separate
but supposediy equal spheres was in tum profoundly inflected by class and
race interests, serving to obscure class inequalities and to underwrite the
forces of imperialism. At the same time, she is anxious to stress that representations of femininity were neither homogeneous nor monolithically repressive; her title signals the claim sustained throughout the book that the
construction of womanhood in mid-Victorian England was often internally
contradictory and open to contestation.

In a concise and lucid introductory chapter, Poovey addresses herself to a
number of theoretical issues central to the politics of culture: questions of
causation, the relative significance and interdependence of factors of gender,
race, and class, the relationship between detennining structures and subjective agency. The chapters that follow contain detailed discussions of specific
"border cases," chosen on the grounds that they exemplify particularly
clearly the contradictions and tensions within Victorian cqnstructions of gender. Poovey examines debates over the use of chloroform in childbirth, the
issue of divorce as it crystallized around the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act,
the construction of the category of the male professional writer and governess and finally, the powerful mythic resonances generated by the figure of
Florence Nightingale. In these discussions, Poovey emphasizes that ideological forms were often multi-layered and non-synchronous; emerging "scientific" models of gender in mid-Victorian England revealed the still powerful influence of more traditional, religious symbolizations of femininity.
The argument that power is never monolithic or exclUSively repressive and
that the theorist of culture must be able to account for resistance as well as
conformism is no longer particularly new, but it is less common to find an
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adept illustration of this insight at the level of specific analysis. Poovey is to
be credited for an account which avoids the functionalism often latent in
theories of ideology while simultaneously resisting the temptation to make
inflated claims for the subversiveness of women's cultural practices. Her
readings are subtle, dialectical and persuasive, showing that certain Victorian
images of femininity-the emergence of the figure of the professional nurse,
for example-were able to at least partially satisfy some women's desires for
activity and agency, while simultaneously working to legitimate bourgeois
and nationalist ideologies. Again, the acknowledgment of the triple importance of race, class and gender has become ritualistic in much critical theory,
but one usually finds in practice that one of these is surreptitiously elevated
to the status of meta-category. For example, the oppOSitional status of Victorian women writers is affinned with little attention to the race and class in-
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equalities underpinning their achievements, or else the work of these same
writers is read as nothing more than bourgeois mystification in obscuring the
real and fundamental antagonisms of class. Poovey's combination of theory
and close textual analysis succeeds in keeping constantly in play the contradictory implications of Victorian ideals of domestic femininity, which allowed
limited spaces for the exercise of female agency while simultaneously helping
to consolidate bourgeois hegemony and reactionary myths of English national identity.
In the penultimate paragraph of her final chapter, Poovey considers some
of the broader theoretical and political implications of her analysis: "To reveal the artificiality of the Victorian definition of difference ... is implicitly to
challenge the importance of the category 'woman'; to give this category a history is implicitly, at least, to call itduture into question" (p. 201). It is this
same insight which provides the guiding thread of "Am I That Name?": Feminism and the Category of 'Women" in History, in which Denise Riley aims to
relativize the current preoccupation with femininity as difference in feminist
theory by situating it within the history of feminist thought. Like Poovey, she
emphasizes that "women" is a shifting and historically variable category, not
in order to align herself with a post-feminist position which argues for the
redundancy of gender distinctions, but to clarify the historicity of feminism's
own project. Riley argues, correctly in my view, not only for a theorizing of
history but also a historicizing of theory, that is, a self-reflexive awareness of
the fact that the construction of femininity in contemporary feminist thought
draws on a complex intellectual history and is shaped by a variety of discursive frameworks, rather than simply arising out of an already given notion of
sexual difference. Riley's analysis attempts to demonstrate that "women" is a
category which fluctuates both synchronically and diachronically and whose
meaning is fundamentally affected by its relationship to other shifting categories: reason, nature, etc. As a result, one cannot simply collapse together
feminism and women's experience, not even by resorting to a more differentiated notion of experience which attempts to account for variables of class,
race and sexual preference; there is no underlying commonality of women's
lives that in itself generates a progressive or oppositional politics. Indeed Riley suggest that it is this very notion of "being a woman," the assumption
that gender saturates all aspects of one's identity, that needs to be subjected
to critical scrutiny, as a set of assumptions that has a specific history.
In three chapters which range from mediaeval Europe to the twentieth century, Riley examines some aspects of that history. She argues that mediaeval
Christianity, while assuming the diminished rationality of women, nevertheless accorded them spiritual equality in terms of access to divine grace, and
that processes of secularization led to the emergence of a concept of nature
profoundly detrimental to women's rights in identifying women exclusively
in terms of their sex. In the following chapter Riley examines the emergence
of what she describes as a new concept of the social in nineteenth-century
England; thoroughly feminized by its association with the family, hygiene,
reform, philanthropy and other female concerns, the sociological domain was
thus explicitly separated from the "male" realm of public and state politics.
Finally, she considers the history of women's suffrage in Great Britain, showing how it has constantly veered between the proclamation of women's status as human beings and the focus on their specific interests as women.
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Riley suggests that this kind of historical analysis of shifting constructions
of gender provides a way of negotiating between the untenable alternatives
of what she describes as deconstruction and transcendence. The feminist construction of woman is unstable, but this instability is neither random nor indeterminate but is shaped by the logic of a particular history: "equality; difference; 'different but equal' -the history of feminism since the 1790s has zizagged and curved through these incomplete oppositions upon which it is
itself precariously erected" (p. 112). The current feminist obsession with "difference" -whether defined psychologically, psychoanalytically, or through a
phenomenology of the body-recognizes only half of this truth; for if women
are constantly compelled to emphasize the specificity of their positioning and
experiences against dominant ideologies which glibly equate the masculine
with the human, feminists have been equally eager to avoid over-zealous
identifications with their sex and to insist on access to the full range of human possibilities. The search for an absolute difference which can provide a
grounding for feminism is thus misguided; on the contrary, Riley argues,
feminism must necessarily oscillate between its concern with particularity
and its insistence that women be allowed access to a full humanity.
Riley's analysis develops significant new theoretical ground in the area of
feminist scholarship and her defense of her position is for the most part subtle and complex, conducted with sophistication yet also with clarity. The author reveals a welcome ability to question received wisdoms within feminist
thought and to grapple with difficult conceptual problems. Particularly useful
is her contention that contradictions within feminist thought cannot simply
be "solved" at the level of theory, but bear witness to tensions and problems
inherent to the sociohistorical development of feminism as a political movement. What seems to me the main difficulty arising from Riley's text is her
reduction of gender to a function of consciousness. This move is apparent in
such statements as the following: "being a woman is more accurately conceived as a state which fluctuates for the individual, depending on what she
and/or others consider to characterise it" (p. 6). Thus, for Riley, "'women'
are only sometimes 'women'," on the grounds that "it's not possible to live
twenty-four hours a day soaked in the immediate awareness of one's sex" (p.
96). It seems to me that a confusion of issues takes place here. It is indeed
plausible to suggest that women are not necessarily always conscious of their
gender and Riley's analysis usefully historicizes this question, saving it from
an arbitrary subjectivism by showing how this awareness of gendered identity is in turn affected by broader shifts in cultural conceptions of femininity.
In other words, it is only under certain historical conditions that women selfconsciously focus on gender as a defining if problematic category of their social identity (rather than on their religion, their age, or any of the other multiple aspects of identity).
At this stage, however, a crucial slippage takes place from the assertion
that women are not always aware of their gendered status to the claim that
"one is not always a woman." It is here that I would disagree with Riley's
position as both voluntarist and idealist. Gender is not simply determined by
conscious attitude or choice of identity, but constitutes a fundamental underlying structure of social organization which affects, in historically and culturally variable ways, the distribution of economic, political and symbolic power
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in all known societies. "Being a woman" is in other words a condition that is
determined by multiple causes and has multiple effects which remain independent of and to some degree inaccessible to individual consciousness. Riley's reliance upon phenomenological arguments, even what she describes as
a "historical and political phenomenology" obscures this issue by reducing
gender to a question of subjective experience and temporality.
While Riley's emphasis on the discursive construction of gender provides a
salutary corrective to those positions which assume an underlying substratum
of authentic female identity across history, it thus engenders problems of its
own. The exclusive focus on discourse as the site where gender difference is
articulated and maintained inspires a voluntarism which assumes that transformations in gender relations are conditional upon changes in representation
alone. Clearly, systems of Signification are relatively autonomous; they are
not, however, free-floating, but linked in complicated and often contradictory
ways to the processes of production and reproduction through which societies ensure their own existence and continuation. This dialectical relationship between the "material"-the body, the natural world, the phYSical environment-and the "cultural" must thus be conceived as one of constant and
mutual interaction: while the material world is always interpreted through
discourse, it cannot simply be reduced to an effect of it. On occasion, Riley's
text seems surprisingly close to a traditional history of ideas, discussing modem conceptions of gender with very little reference to economic interests or
the logic of capitalist expansion as determining factors in the emergence of
such conceptions. Similarly, while Riley persuasively demonstrates the limitations of any appeal to the female body as unmediated source of difference,
feminists must surely address the significance of such biological factors as
women's reproductive capacity as a fundamental determining factor in the
perpetuation of systems of gender hierarchy. It does not seem to me that
such attention to material constraints requires, as Riley assumes, a recourse to

ontolOgical foundations or a belief in an underlying substratum of femininity
that remains constant throughout history.
While sympathetic to much of Riley's argument, then, I would differ with
her claim that "women" are only sometimes "women"-as if gender could
be slipped in and out of as easily as a dress. The claim can perhaps be more
usefully rephrased as follows: women are never only women, but many other
things as well-they possess a class, a race, a sexuality, an educational history, a histOrically and culturally specific background, and they are of course,
as Riley reminds us, human beings as well. It is through the interplay and
conflict between these multiple, historically variable but always operative determinants of subjectivity that the relative indeterminacy of identity becomes
apparent, rather than through the temporary transcendence of anyone of
them. In my view, the most promising and exciting feminist work which is
being produced at present centers precisely around this premise and this
problematic.

Murdoch University, Western Australia

Rita Felski

Criticism, Vol. XXXI, No.4: Book Reviews

463

Notes
1. Fredric Jameson, "An Overview," in Tak-Wai Wong and M.A. Abbas,
eds., Rewriting Literary History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong up, 1984).

Sor Juana
Sor Juana or, The Traps of Faith, by Octavia Paz, translated by Margaret Sayers Peden. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
Press, 1988. Pp. 547. $29.95, cloth.

A Sor Juana Anthology, translated by Alan S. Trueblood, foreword by Octavio
Paz. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard Univ. Press,
1988. Pp. 248. $29.50, cloth.

Sor Juana's Dream, translation, introduction, and commentary by Luis Harss.
New York: Lumen Books, 1986. Pp. 146. $9.95, paper.
In opening his eloquent and elegant book on Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz,
seventeenth-century Mexican poet, playwright, intellectual, and nun, Octavio
Paz claims that "A work responds to the reader's, not the author's questions"
(p. 3). Women readers of a great man's interpretation of a great woman's life
and work are presented immediately with a challenge and a problem. As the
invisible part of "mankind" we know that both the woman subject and we,
the women readers, are part of a complex series of unstated exclusions and
inclusions. Paradoxically, gender-sensitive readers of Criticism, because of the
kind of questions they ask, may be in a better position than Paz to playa role
in expanding the conception of feminism's basic writings and in appreciating
the scope of this particular writer's feminist vision. A woman of astonishing
consciousness, Sor Juana turned the world upSide-down and inside-out with
such Baroque aplomb that it has taken until the twentieth century for us to
rediscover the breadth of her art and the depth of her epistemology.
Juana Ramirez, born in 1648, chose the convent at the age of nineteen, after five years as a lady-in-waiting at the viceregal court of New Spain (Mexico). A reader at four years of age, competent in Latin after twenty lessons,
she insisted that her prodigious learning reflected tenacious effort as well as a
privileged memory, and that she had taken to rhyming as others take to their
native tongue. By the age of eleven she had written her first poem. In the
books she devoured, initially in her grandfather's library, then at court, and
finally in her own voluminous collection, she encountered varying degrees of
misogyny. She paid more attention, however, to the considerable number of
references to what she termed "throngs" of learned women who through the
centuries had distinguished themselves in a wide range of fields. Despite her
absorption in the theolOgical and literary artifacts of a male-dominated civilization, Sor Juana compared herself to Sappho and to more than fifty other
learned women, real and legendary. According to Diego Calleja, a Spanish
priest who wrote the earliest biography, as an imprimatur (nihil obstat) to the
third and final volume of her works, the young Juana submitted to a public
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examination of her already notorious intellectual gifts by forty of the most
knowledgeable men of the realm. She defended herself, he reported, '1ike a
royal galleon attacked by small canoes." The event led her to identify with
st. Catherine of Alexandria:
There in Egypt, all the sages
by a woman were convinced

that gender is not of the essence
in matters of intelligence.

Victor! Victor!
A victoryJ a miraclej
though more prodigious than the feat
of conquering, was surely that
the men themselves declared defeat.

Victor! Victor!
(Sayers Peden translation; Paz, p. 435)
This insistance on the soul's lack of gender is a persistent theme in all her
work. Finding life at court untenable, and the idea of marriage abhorrent,
Juana Ramirez chose the convent where she would have more tranquility for
study-the real love of her life. There, too, she would be free to write courtly
yet personal love poetry dedicated for the most part to the two women who
most ardently encouraged her scholarly and literary pursuits. When the first
of these, the Vicereine Leonor Carreto, Marquise de Mancera, died in 1674,
Sor Juana had been in the convent for five years. She gave rein to her sorrow
in an elegiac sonnet that implies a literary as well as affectionate relationship:
Let them die with you, Laura, now you are dead,
these longings that go out to you in vain,
these eyes on whom you once bestowed
a lovely light never to gleam again.
Let this unfortunate lyre that echoes still
to sounds you woke, perish calling your name,
and may these clumsy scribblings represent
black tears my pen has shed to ease its pain.
Let Death himself feel pity, and regret
that, bound by his own law, he could not spare you,
and Love lament the bitter circumstance
that if once, in his desire for pleasure,
he wished for eyes that they might feast on you,
now weeping is all those eyes could ever do.
(Trueblood, pp. 101, 103)
To the second, Vicereine Maria Luisa Manrique de Lara y Gonzaga, Marquise
de la Laguna, Countess de Paredes, a frequent visitor at the convent, an avid
supporter who took Sor Juana's poems to Spain and had her first book published, she wrote:
I, like air ftlling a vacuum,
like fire feeding on matter,
like rocks plummeting earthward,
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like the will set on a goalin short, as all things in Nature,
moved by a will to endure,
are drawn together by love
in closely knit embrace ...

But, Phyllis, why go on?
For yourself alone I love you.
Considering your merits,
what more is there to say?
That you're a woman far away
is no hindrance to my love:

for the soul, as you well know,
distance and sex don't count.

(Trueblood, p. 39)
The cloistered Sor Juana spent the rest of her life in quarters whose comfort
and amplitude made them more salon than cell. Attended by several servants
(as were other nuns of her station), she entertained numerous visiting aristo-

crats, ecclesiastics and scholars, conducted wide (but lost) correspondence
with many others, and held monastic offices as teacher and keeper of convent financial records. Four years before her death, she was forced to sell and
contribute to charity a voluminous library and her musical and scientific instruments, sign a confession, and dedicate herself to penance and self-

sacrifice. She fell victim to an epidemic in 1695 while caring for her sisters.
In the course of twenty-six years of convent life, Sor Juana became the ma-

jor literary figure of New Spain, producing sixty-five sonnets (including some
twenty love sonnets, deemed by many among the most beautiful of the seventeenth-century); sixty-two romances (ballads); and a profusion of endechas,
redondillas, liras, decimas, silvas and other metrical forms employed during
Spain's Golden Age. For theater Sor Juana wrote three sacramental Autos and
two comedies (one a collaboration), along with the farces that preceded the
plays and were performed between the acts; thirty-two loas, sung and performed for religious and viceroyal celebrations; and fifteen or sixteen sets of

villancicos (carols) for Matins, each with eight or nine songs, all elaborations
of religiOUS themes such as the Nativity, the Assumption, the Immaculate
Conception, Saint Joseph, Saint Peter, and Saint Catherine.
The poem she herself most respected, is the 975-verse-Iong, "Primero
sueilo" [First Dream], an exaltation of the poet's insatiable thirst to encompass
all human knowledge:
Such an immense assemblage,
a mass so unemcompassable,

though holding out to sight
some chance of being taken in,

to ascend the lofty stair,
by cultivation, first of one,
then of another form of knowledge
till honor's summit gradually comes in view,
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the easeful goal of a most laborious climb
(Trueblood, pp. 164, 168)
"First Dream" is generally considered the most important philosophical
poem in the Spanish language. Paz devotes 30 pages to underscoring its
modernity and originality. Trueblood admires its statement "in favor of the
human spirit's right to unimpeded growth" (p. 23). Harss understands that
St. Catherine (about whom Sor Juana wrote her most feminist religious verse,
a few lines of which I quoted above), hovers in the dream, "a constant reminder of the dangers of the Word turned against those who would usurp Its
powers" (p. 12).
Indeed, the powers of the word occasioned for Sor Juana the gravest and
most persistent conflicts of her life. The consciousness of gender and its implications pervade her poetry with such grace and charm that the more troublesome connotations somehow escaped immediate censure. Once Sor Juana
engaged in public theological controversy in prose, art could no longer protect her from inquisitorial mentalities. She ventured to refute a famous Portuguese Jesuit preacher's "Maundy Thursday Sermon" (a disquisition on Jesus
Christ's highest favor to human beings that piqued Sor Juana by its claim to
better the arguments of Saints Augustine, Thomas, and John Chrysostom).
The Bishop of Puebla, greatly impressed, published the refutation under the
title "Letter Worthy of Athena," along with an admonishing letter, signed
pseudonymously "Sor Philothea." The significance of Sor Juana's one incursion into theological argumentation resides not so much in its admirable reasoning and style, as in its having heightened the envy and antagonism of the
ecclesiastic establishment against her and provided the motivation for her
most Significant prose work. Feeling betrayed by alleged friends, Sor Juana
wrote the "Reply to Sor Philothea:"
Those most harmful and painful to me are not the persons who have
pursued me with open hatred and ill will, but those who, while loving
me and wishing me well . . . have mortified and tortured me much
more than the others, with their: "This study is incompatible with the
blessed ignorance to which you are bound. You will lose your way, at
such heights your head will be turned by your very perspicacity and
sharpness of mind." What have I not gone through to hold out against
this? Strange sort of martyrdom, in which I was both the martyr and
my own executioner. (Trueblood, p. 218)
The history of Sor Juana's last writings, is a central thread of Paz's biographical narrative. Another important document, fundamental to the story,
but discovered while Paz was working on the biography, was left for the appendix. It is a letter Sor Juana wrote ten years earlier-using discursive strategies she later developed in the Reply-in which she essentially "fIred" her
confessor. When she wrote it, in 1681-2, Sor Juana was a leading light in a
culturally flamboyant environment. She moved with relative impunity, protected and encouraged, especially by the Vicereines, but also by the Viceroys
and a segment of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Cultivating her intelligence and
composing works both secular and religious, over and over she legitimized
and authorized her own and all women's subjective integrity.
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But by the end of the decade her situation and that of New Spain had
changed drastically. Economic, social, and political crisis engulfed the realm.
Her most significant supports had returned to Spain or lost favor. The Archbishop of Mexico and her rejected confessor who for years had wanted to
press for "behavior more befitting a nun," were about to get their chance.

The Reply is not only an autobiographical self-defense, an infinitely clever
retort-laced with anger and outrage-to criticism of her theological opinions and of her dedication to secular learning and writing. It is also a cornered writer's announcement of her imminent decision to still her quill forever. The shadow of the Inquisition was never far away. Faced with a persecution that would silence her, she silenced herself, declaring: "as far as my
natural defense is concerned, I will never put pen to paper ... " (Trueblood,
p. 240). So subtly did she hide the declaration among the foliage of her prose
that not a critic I know of has sighted it. Unconscious resistance to acknowledging how actively Sor juana controlled her own sounds and silences may
be one reason it has been missed.
The thirty-five page "Reply" itself would assure Sor juana's position as an
important writer, thinker, and feminist. The first American declaration of
women's intellectual emancipation, the Reply (1691) stands three centuries
after Christine de Pizan's The Book of the City of Ladies (1404) and a century
before Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792). It belongs among the basic writings of a long women's tradition that is still being
reconstructed.
Sexual and colonialist politics, as well as more general linguistic and cultural attitudes common in publishing, explain why it has taken so long for
the Harvard University Press volumes to introduce so major a figure of Hispanic letters to a wide English reading public. North American women (and
some men) writers and scholars have written about and translated Sor juana
since the 1920's. The pioneer among them was Dorothy Shons who located
important primary sources, announced Sor Juana's significance as an early
feminist and left, at her death, an unpublished fictionalized biography.' In
the early 1980's, Margaret Sayers Peden, who spent several years at the
daunting task of translating the Paz biography, with its numerous illustrations of Sor juana's poetry, published a translation of the Reply.' Versions of
many poems, close to the original, fluent and "sprightly" (Alastair Reed) appear in her bilingual anthology.' Sor juana has been translated into English
by others. Samuel Beckett translated a 77-line fragment of the poem.
Amanda Powell's renditions, especially sensitive to the subtleties of gender
as well as style have been performed on stage.'
Octavio Paz's Sor Juana or, The Traps of Faith, first published in Spanish in
1982, is a useful and important biographical work, with ample exemplification of the subject's writing in Sayers Peden's close translations. It is also an
infuriating book. Alan Trueblood's A Sor Juana Anthology, presented as a
companion to the Paz biographYI stands on its own as a sllccinctl erudite introduction to, and a lyrically vibrant recreation in English of the poet's writing. Luis Harss's, Sor Juana's Dream, changes and complicates the beauty of
that long and most difficult of poems, in its English rendering.
Sor Juana or, The Traps of Faith, is a tour de force-biography, cultural history and ideological criticism all in one. It describes the intellectual, political
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and religious climate of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Mexico; comments

on the poet as rebel against orthodoxy, then and now; and studies the life,
times, and art of a woman with whom Paz identifies and to whom he implicitly compares himself. Using T.S. Eliot's criteria for designating a major poet
-excellence, abundance and diversity-Paz speaks of Sor Juana, illustrating
and analyzing each of these characteristics. Paz's portrayal, however, fails to
capture the meaning for Sor Juana-and for other women-of history, of experience, and of the pursuit of knowledge and art. He gives no indication of
having consulted the work of feminist theorists, scholars and critics of the
last thirty years. In a lengthy digression on the literature of courtly love, for
instance, there is no mention of the women troubadours among the Proven~al poets. Diffuse elucubrations on Neoplatonism, hermeticism, and literary
love in the Western world weaken the book. Simplifying analogies between
contemporary communism and the colonial Church contrast with Paz's complex analysis of the Baroque period: "Trotsky affirms with innocent pride that
there is nothing personal in his drama ... Sor Juana's reiterated affirmations,

in her critique of Vieyra's sermon, that God had chosen an ignorant woman

(herself) to humble a proud man foreshadows ... the Russian revolutionary's rationale" (p. 487). There was nothing innocent in Sor Juana's protestations of ignorance; she was employing a strategy commonly used by women
writers of the time, especially nuns. But it is Paz's sexism and polarized convictions regarding gender that most distort his view of Sor Juana Ines de la
Cruz: "The movement toward the masculine is mingled with the process of
apprenticeship ... she wants to possess masculine values because she wants

to be like a man ... [a]ntipathy to marriage, love of learning, masculinization,
neutralization: all these revolve into a no less powerful word, solitude . ...

her "masculinity" ... exists alongside the most intense femininity" (p. 112).
The work of both Trueblood and Harss, as opposed to that of Paz, is informed by a range of recent scholarly and critical essays on Sor Juana that includes studies of her writing from a feminist perspective. A Sor Juana Anthology presents a well-selected sampling of Sor Juana's poetry and prose. Paralleling Paz's biographical and critical sequence, it includes poems in a variety
of meters, among them her most notable sonnets, and selections from her villancicos (lyrics for interludes of song and dance during religiOUS festivities)
and The Divine Narcissus, the best of her three autos sacramentales (one-act
plays in celebration of the Eucharist). First Dream, and Reply to Sor Philothea
complete the book. While I would take issue with Trueblood's unquestioning
acceptance of Paz's interpretations of Sor Juana's Neoplatonic idealizationswhich ignore her and other women writers' counterpointed variations of Pe-

trarchan tradition-and his characterization of the Reply's "almost programmatic feminism" (p. 17), his succinct introductory overview of the various literary and intellectual currents upon which the poet drew synthesizes in a
few pages what it takes Paz several chapters to unravel.
Most of the translations are more than felicitous. Nowhere are there the
strained attempts to be faithful that often mar the work of academics. Some
renditions, nevertheless, raise Significant gender issues: "Si los riesgos del
mar considerara,/ninguno se embarcara ... is translated: "If men weighted
the hazards of the sea,inone would embark ... " (96-97). I wish Trueblood
/I

had sought another solution since Sor Juana did not employ the word "men"

r
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in the first line of this sonnet, and especially since the last line bears a particularly autobiographical note, a regret for having chosen "a way of life binding a whole life through." He might have tried "If one should weigh" or "If
having weighed" or, literally, "If the hazards of the sea were considered" for
example. "Diutuma enfermedad de la esperanza" becomes "Hope, longlasting fever of men's lives" (98-99). Yet there is absolutely no reference to
"men" in the Spanish original. Moreover, in the next line she refers to llmis
cansados anos," translated exactly as "my weary years" (emphasis mine)
which makes the gender-generalized term of the previous line seem all the
more inappropriate. In the same poem" Lquien te ha quitado el nombre de
homicida?" is rendered "Who claimed you never killed a man?" The line
might have kept its neutrality: Who claimed you were no longer a homicide?
or, Who claimed you no longer committed homicide? As a final example, in
the elegy to the vicereine Leonor Carreto, cited above, Trueblood inexplicably employs the pronoun "he" for "la muerte," death, which is a feminine
noun in Spanish.
Harss's translation of Sor Juana's longest, most difficult poem, the extraordinary First Dream, or simply Dream, has the advantage of a bilingual presentation. The introduction and line by line commentary enrich and stimulate
the readers' responses. It too could be faulted for occasional lapses in gender
consciousness. In a passage in which Sor Juana dwells on the enthronment of
feminine "Naturaleza" [nature] (p. 59), for example, there is the entirely gratuitous addition of two lines, nowhere in evidence in the Spanish, and both
emphatically insistent on a divine male's potency: "on him resting His magnificence,fcontent with His design" (p. 58). But the two translations could
hardly be more different. From the very beginning Harss's version takes
more liberties than does Trueblood's; often confusingly unfaithful to line by
line sequence, his reinvention of baroque grammatical convolutions manages
to recreate the poem's verbal intensity:

Piramidal, funesta de la tierra
nacida sombra, al Cielo eneaminaba
de vanos obeliseos punta altiva,
esealar pretendiendo las Estrellas. ...
A shadow born of Earth,
bleak pyramid, vain obelisk
pretending to scale Heaven
pointed to the stars ....
(Harss, pp. 28-29)
Pyramidal, lugubrious,
a shadow born of earth
pushed heavenward its towering tips
like vacuous obelisks bent on scaling stars,
(Trueblood, p. 171)
As male readers of Sor Juana's texts and of her life, all three authors being
reviewed, but especially Paz, present us with a polished view of patriarchal
culture into which they fit Sor Juana's feminism. This would not have sur-
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prised Sor Juana; she read men as a woman reader and writer, noticing the
poison darts aimed toward those of her gender (darts so proverbial as to be
considered harmless truths). Most critics still treat Sor Juana's feminism as if
it were an overlay rather than a point of departure. Paz, Trueblood, and
Harss explicate central concepts of modem culture, and invite us to think
about art with a broad, flexible socio-cultural outlook. But they fail fully to
grasp Sor Juana's persistent and cunning subversions of official ideas and
myths regarding civilization itself. A victim of ecclesiastic persecution, toward
the end of her life she renounced writing and study. Before condemning herself to silence she had announced her wilIingness to pay for her daring. She
sang:
... to the undaunted spirit
that, disdaining life, determines
to immortalize itself in ruin.

College of Staten Island, C.U.N.Y.

Electa Arenal

Notes
1. Sor Juana scholar Georgina Sabat-Rivers is preparing an edition of this

manuscript. Sabat-Rivers's essay, "A Feminist Re-reading of Sor Juana's
Dream," and another on the same poem by this reviewer, appear in Stephanie Merrim (ed.), Towards A Feminist Understanding of Sor Juana Ines de la
Cruz (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, forthcoming, 1990).
2. Published bilingually (always an advantage) as A Woman of Genius: The
Intellectual Autobiography of Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz 2nd ed. (Salisbury, CT:
Lime Rock Press, 1987). For the Source Book Series of the Feminist Press,
Amanda Powell and I will prepare an annotated version with Powell's translation and an introduction placing Sor Juana's work in the long tradition of
feminist writing and the history of the querelle des femmes, so well treated, although without mention of this source, by Joan Kelly in her "Early Feminist
Theory and the Querelle des Femmes, 1400-1789," Women, History, and
Theory (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984).
3. Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz, Poems: A Bilingual Anthology (Bilingual
Press/Editorial BilingUe: Binghamton, New York, 1985).
4. They appear in the dramatic recreation of Sor Juana's and Anne Bradstreet's life and work I composed ten years ago, and which was published,
along with an introduction to the two poets in Bell Gale Chevigny and Gari
Laguardia (eds.), Reinventing the Americas: Comparative Studies of Literature of
the United States and Spanish America (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1986), pp. 158-202. Recently published, with a few of her own direct translations, is Diane Ackerman's witty, romantic drama, Reverse Thunder, based in
part on Sor Juana's life, (New York: Lumen Books, 1988).
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Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers edited by Laurie A. Finke and Martin B. Shichtman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. Pp. 253. $29.95,
cloth; $12.95, paper.
This collection of articles brings questions from contemporary theory to
bear on medieval studies and thereby addresses the urgent need for critical
self-examination that many medievalists perceive in their discipline. Hoping
to end what Eugence Vance has called "the stand-off between medievalists
and critical theorists," Finke and Shichtman trust their effort "will initiate a
dialogue between the skeptical and the converted, a dialogue that has been
too long delayed" (p. viii). Yet they are also aware of the difficulties of this
project, which stem from the medieval academy's traditional isolation from
other branches of literary studies as well as internal barriers against selfscrutiny.
The collection's introduction addresses the relationship between the present and its distant past which both frustrated and fascinated medievalists
long before the current rebirth of interest in literary history. Medieval literature poses a special problem, as the editors note, since the apparatus of its
mediation is always so visible, in "the editions, glosses, textual notes, manuscript facsimiles, transcriptions and translations through which medieval literature is filtered and transmitted" (p. 1). While the category of the Middle
Ages has been constructed by successive generations of modern scholars, editors, and readers, one dominant tendency has been to hide its constructedness. Such theoretical elusiveness has allowed recent critics to conceive the

Middle Ages both as an irretrievable object of nostalgia (a theme, it seems to
me, which permeates the rhetoric of the late seventies' "Alterity of the Middle Ages" debates) and as a historical unity open to unproblematic interpretation. In promising to call contemporary readers onto the same stage as the
medieval texts they have been invisibly editing, interpreting, and teaching,
the title of the collection promises to examine a difficult relationship that has
long been veiled. The introduction outlines such a project of critical selfevaluation: "Our contributors suggest in several ways that contemporary literary theory should not imply a simplistic rejection of traditional medieval
scholarship but rather encourage an ongoing reevaluation of the critical as-

sumptions currently structuring the discipline" (p. 5). But how successful are
the contributors in addressing this most challenging task?
While eager to endorse the application of "theory" to medieval texts, many
of the essays in Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers aim to the side of
the book's self-defined mark. Though addressed to a stubborn medieval
academy, they timidly overlook the bases upon which that academy resists
"theory" and thus-despite the introduction's revisionist aim-they too often leave intact the anti-theoretical stances ostensibly being challenged.

A danger in any project of this sort is the tendency to perceive "theory" as
a unified body once it becomes a principle of organization. But one purpose
common to theoretical examinations may be to expose the assumptions and

myths sedimented beneath the stances we take in pretences of neutrality.
Such examination would move away from the traditional explication de texte
to examine Critically the act of reading: its institutional structures, our ideo-

logical investments, and the particular desire that drives a reader in the twen-
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tieth century to seek pleasure in a very old book. Several articles successfully
raise such provocative questions; others, however, avoid them.
Laurie Finke's essay on "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning in Piers
Plowman" approaches her fertile subject by using Augustine and Paul de
Man to illustrate the failures of allegory as a means for exploring truth. Finke
proposes to "examine in more detail the interrelations between some medieval and postmodern concepts of allegory" (p. 53, emphasis mine); but rather
than pursuing these "interrelations," she suggests that "the contradictions
and silences within Augustine's theory of allegory are archetypal and hence
may illuminate the Yale critics' interest in allegory" (p. 55). Traditionally employed to justify and direct modem interest in the Middle Ages, the notion of
"the archetype" suggests a transhistorical bridge between past and present.
Here it is invoked at the cost of serious exploration of either.
Other essays make poststructuralist theories seem somehow organic to the
Middle Ages and thus avoid important self-examination. Thus, for example,
Marina Scordilis Brownlee can find modem concerns reproduced in old texts
("problematic issues of modem reading theory ... are, in fa -I, inscribed into
the dynamic structure of this late medieval Spanish text" (p. 232, emphasis
mine), and Alain Renoir can imagine a theory that could elide massive differences in historical periods ("at the close of the twentieth century the oralformulaic approach to the study of medieval literature is immensely attractive
because it allows us ... to link past and present" [po 252]). What these accounts lack is a serious inquiry into the historical implications of their theoretical project-and into the relationship of medieval text to contemporary
reader-that could make theory anything more than another medievalist's
tool, with the usefulness of something like paleography, to help the embattled reader discover the truth about his or her remote object of study.
Theory might help us rethink our notion of the Middle Ages while releasing it from the teleology of literary history that has needed a category to fIll
in the blank space between two Golden Ages. In this way historiographical
inquiry might find in poststructuralist theory a way to reevaluate the category of the Middle Ages itself and to examine its political uses as an eighteenth and nineteenth-century invention. In "Gawain in Wace and Layamon:
A Case of Metahistorical Evolution," Martin Shichtman performs a reading of
Wace and Layamon through Hayden White and Michel Foucault that accepts
and reproduces the historical narratives it would otherwise seem to criticize.
"Foucault," he writes, "claims that the 'new history' challenges earlier principles of cohesion . . . It provides for a way of reseeing history and ultimately
liberates the historian from the continuous tracing back to origins" (p. 105).
He ends by explaining his approach with a traditional medievalist's promise:
"Contemporary histOriographical theory ... may, therefore, allow us to see
medieval historians much as they might have seen themselves" (p. 118): that
is, as creative writers of history rather than remote observers of it. What is
striking in this account is the way it skirts its own critique of historiography
in order to arrive at an unexamined conclusion: we can separate the past
from our own narrative about it. Such a conclusion logically involves a repudiation of White's provocative statement that the contents of historical narratives "are as much invented as found," (cited p. 105) but Shichtman indicates
no inconsistency. Rather than allowing us to question the bases on which we
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hold our own myths about the past, including those about the Middle Ages,
Shichtman in the end tames Foucauldian historical inquiry into a tool that
enables us to see more clearly what we've believed all along.
Several other essays also domesticate theory by using it to tease out thematic concerns while avoiding institutional ones. In '''I Shal Finde It in a
Maner Glose": Versions of Textual Harassment in Medieval literature," Robert Hanning begins an essay on medieval glossing practices-a fascinating
and troublesome topic in the field which forces questions about the relations
between reader and writer, the book and what is excluded from or literally
marginal to it-only to tum back to a thematic reading that, paradoxically,
reproduces traditional categories of literariness, along with some disturbingly
conventional interpretations of Criseyde and the Wife of Bath.
In his discussion of "Affective Criticism and Medieval English literature"
Peter Travis explains that "Rezeptionsasthetik ... assumes that artistic meaning is determined by the way a text is received by its audience" (p. 202), yet
does not consider the possibility that such an audience includes not just
fourteenth-century listeners, but also twentieth-century medievalists, as well
as generations of readers, editors, and printers who came in between and
made the former available to the latter. As a result, the problematics of medieval text and contemporary reader have been willed out of the way in the interest of a unified reading.
The articles most responsive to the challenges of the book's project articulate what is at stake in the conflict without necessarily seeking reconciliation.
In "Wandryinge by the Waye: On Alisoun and Augustine" Peggy Knapp
tums her unsettling consideration of "glose" in the Wife of Bath's Tale onto
her own reading as it too functions as a gloss. Asserting that "to gloss is to
disclose deep meaning . . . or to prevent disclosure of deep meaning by presenting an attractive but deceptive surface," Knapp then suggests that "these
observations point to direct consequences for our glossing of Alisoun's
story." (p. 154) Any critical stance implicates not only the medieval text but
also the contemporary reader. Foregrounding both, Knapp indicates her own
argument's status as a text open to interpretation.
Other contributors suggest non-traditional interpretations of canonical
texts, challenging with Knapp the received "medieval world view." H. Marshall Leicester's "Oure Tonges Differanee: Textuality and Deconstruction in
Chaucer" reads the sense of separation from the mythical past that surfaces
in Troilus and Criseyde as the nostalgia in a textual culture for the imagined
wholeness of an oral one. Taken from a wide-ranging article, this example
could suggest a radical rereading of Chaucer's poem. Rachel Iacoff challenges
conventional readings of Dante's debt to Virgil in "Models of literary Influence in the Commedia," leading to a provocative discussion of Dante's use of
gender reversal in metaphors. If Beatrice is a ship's admiral and Virgil a loving mother, Dante has introduced a possibility of feminine mediation certainly missing from his classical models. In addition, in "Inter Noeturnas Vigilias: A Proof Postponed," Louis H. Mackey considers the implications of Anselm's debate with Gaunilon over the failure of language to yield its ineffable
referent, God, for a culture in which such a question is crucial.
Alexandre Leupin displays concerns that respond to a wider range of questions than are addressed by many of the contributors to this volume. Else-
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where Leupin discusses the conflict between medievalists cloistered in their
studies and literary theorists who may be, paradoxically, entrenched in a
humanist vision of literary history that insists on cordoning off the Middle
Ages as a historical Other, criticizing the "logic of history" that insists on an
"epistemological break" between a medieval and a modem world-view (see
Diacritics, 13 [1983], pp. 22-31). In his contribution "Absolute Reflexivity:
Geoffroi de Vinsauf" he historicizes the very notion of modernity in a discussion of the Poetria Nova with a full understanding of the provocative implications of his project: "My intention, then, is to restore the problem of modemitas to Geoffroi's work, to follow the developments of this problem, and to
grasp its relation to history; while demonstrating the pertinence of this issue
in a thirteenth-century context, I shall also stress its importance for our own
age, a period that traces its "modernity" only as far back as the romantic era"
(p. 121). Opposite the category of modemitas Leupin places the caduc, the old
or obsolete (p. 124), which is always invoked to enable its refinement. Thus
"The Poetria . . . theorizes the act of writing as a constant and endless transformation of the obsolete, a perpetual reclaiming of the old" (p. 125). It is the
obsolete, marked by its alterity, that allows writing to take place under the
name of rejuvenatio.
Scholars of Renaissance literature might easily recognize here elements of
sixteenth-century rhetorical discussions through which writers conceived
their own modernity. Nor is it difficult to see a version of the caduc in Sidney's dismissal of Chaucer's "misty time." It is curious, however, that the
concept of the Middle Ages has always occupied that space of historical otherness, and indeed seems to have been invented precisely to guarantee the
identity that humanist (and even avowedly anti-humanist) critics narcissistically seek mirrored in the texts that they read.
What is at stake, then, in the efforts to introduce critical theory to medieval
studies? Leupin and others have suggested that it is nothing short of the dismantlement of medievalism as an institution, as we question categories of literariness as well as literary history that continue to enable its conception. We
might be able to see "the medieval" as an interpretive category rather than
an event-like the printing press, the Reformation, or the death of Richard III
-while we question its function in literary studies as well as its resistance to
theoretical inquiry. Serious examination of pre-typographical literature might
even challenge the institutions of genre, authorship, and canonicity that
structure many departments of literature. Toward these directions efforts like
Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers are vital. Suggesting new perspectives through which we can reevaluate institutional medieval studies, this
book establishes the importance of theoretical inquiry to scholars of early literature. The impressive array of established scholars the editors have assembled for this collection indicates that the medieval academy will no longer be
able to ignore the challenges of post-structuralist theory to that institution.
But the uneven success with which these articles pursue such theoretical
challenges also suggests directions for the enormous tasks ahead.

The Johns Hopkins University

Jennifer Sununit

Criticism, Vol. XXXI, No.4: Book Reviews

475

Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and Its Discontents by Leah S. Marcus.
Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 267. $35.00, cloth.
Puzzling Shakespeare, the sixth work to appear in The New Historicism:
Studies in Cultural Poetics, is a thoughtful, challenging book which shares certain self-acknowledged family resemblances to various projects currently
prominent in Renaissance literary/cultural studies. Among these features are
appropriations of certain propensities of deconstruction and certain methodo-

logical aspects of traditional literary historical enquiry as expanded by
Geertzian cultural "thick description" and redirected in pursuit of thematic
interests in textualityl power relations, gender construction, author function,

marginality, and humanist subjectivity. So, for example, in reflecting on her
reading of Cymbeline as both following and resisting an authoritative "Jacobean line/' the author observes:
In part, of course, we find such resistance because we want to find it-

pursuing differance is usually more congenial for new historicists and
other postmodernist critics than constructing idealized versions of harmony. And yet, there is reason to suppose that contemporary audiences might have felt a similar discomfort with the play's call for unity.
Along with an array of relatively commonplace Stuart motifs, Cymbeline displays a number of specific mechanisms which work against the
communication of its Stuart message, engendering an unease with topi-

cality which is specific to this play. We might call it an unease with Jacobean textuality. (p. 117)
The most distinctive element in the critical synthesis evoked in this representative passage is the complexity of its engagement with "topicality," an
aspect of the larger concern with and practice of "local reading" which drives
this book's wide-ranging analyses through extended encounters with "Shakespeare," Henry VI, Cymbeline, and Measure for Measure in chapters strategically and respectively titled: "Localization," "Elizabeth," "James," and "London."
The premise, promise, practice, and problems of Puzzling Shakespeare may
be localized in localization. If finally you can't have one without the other,
the fact that the book might make one want to accept the costs of living with
the problems in hopes of seeing the promise even partially fulfIlled is a tribute to the author and the profound-perhaps "local" -appeal of her premise: a premise no more tellingly embodied than in the "and yet" trope so crucial to the above passage, so movingly and variously reiterated and so deeply
inscribed throughout the book-from striking dustjacket to densely scholarly
endnotes. The premise is that the historicizing post-modern critic, through
the relentless practice of localization-exercised reciprocally upon herself as
well as upon her object-might, however tentatively, come to recognize certain contours of the historicalfcultural other's "locality" that are not merely
reproductions of her own locale. As the author puts it, '''local' reading can be
-and should be-a suspension of our ruling methodologies, insofar as that
is pOSSible, in favor of a more open and provisional stance toward what we
read and the modes by which we interpret; it should be a process of contin-
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ual negotiation between our own place, to the extent that we are able to identify it, and the local places of the texts we read" (p. 36). Yet despite such salutary (and of late almost ritually familiar) acknowledgments of interpretive situation, the problems in the book's practice seem to me precisely those which
affirmation of a "more open and provisional stance toward what we read"
would appear to address in principle.
Openness and provisionality appear to be the message of the dustjacket's
reproduction of the First Folio's well-known title page portrait of Shakespeare in the defamiliarized and "open" form of a partially assembled puzzle. Indeed, the book's first chapter offers extended analysis of features of the
First Folio including its portrait in hopes of overcoming the "humanist overlay" (p. 30), the "mystifications" (p. 35) which have generated an idealized,
abstractly human "Shakespeare" for all time rather than of an age. This interpretation appears supported by the fact that the puzzle figure appears to
be missing at least one of its pieces, leaving "Shakespeare" forever incomplete-open to the local readings of the ages. Puzzling Shakespeare warns us
that opening "Shakespeare" to local particularities runs a certain risk: "If we
insist on clinging to such ephemera, the [First Folio] seems to tell us, we will
lose the' essence' of Shakespeare and fragment the unstable, generalized figure that the First Folio constructs" (p. 25). This warning is reflected in the
dustjacket's design, for its most prominent feature is not its missing piece but
its pieces turned askew to allow darkness and fragmentation into the broad
expanse of the portrait's otherwise smoothly white forehead. The right brain
is severely opened and displaced, but it is the wounded left brain precisely
skewered by a round small-calibre hole that might suggest, as I shall argue,
that post-modern fragmentation is not the only feature of localization local to
our time rather than Shakespeare's.
In the process of combatting certain essentialist readings and their intentionalities, Puzzling Shakespeare, although far more intellectually challenging
than older literary historical attempts to read "Shakespeare" (or "James,"
"Elizabeth," or "London," for that matter) in terms of intentionality by virtue
of its attention to cultural/political phenomena-e.g. "suppressed anxiety"
(p. 64), "anxious fantasies" (p. 66), "projection" (p. 80), "airing through displacement" (p. 83), "styles of legal authority" (p. 175), and the like-nevertheless repeatedly engages in the construction of essences and the ascribing
of intentionalities. So, for example, the "essence" of the First Folio's universalized Shakespeare is contested in the name of a counter-essence, premised
as unstable, to be sure, but remarkably stabilizing in practice: one reads of
the "priorities which Renaissance audiences habitually brought to the theater" and of the "primary object of [their] fascination" (p. 26) in assertions
designed to support the claim that "Local meaning was at the center-an 'essence' inherently unstable in that it altered along with shifting circumstances" (p. 26). Similarly, the First Folio's ommissions of biographical and
theatrical information become acts of a local (albeit depersonalized) intentionality in such locutions as references to its "suppression of a host of particularities" (p. 25), or to "particularities the First Folio was at pains to suppress" (p. 32), or to an ommission "probably not inadvertent" (p. 106), or to
a "reticence about place among the devices by which it sloughs off particularizing details" (p. 160). Such strategic rhetoric-by no means limited to the
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instances and applications here cited-would perhaps be undeserving of attention if it occurred in a critical text less self-conscious than this one or,
more importantly, in a text less committed to historicizing localization.
Localization is defmed by its openness to the demands, even the troublesome, conflicting demands, of particularities that resist assimilation to simple
intentionality (see e.g. p. 32). If it differs from older forms of topical interpretation, surely, this must be, as the author asserts, part of its distinctiveness.
And Puzzling Shakespeare does provide a dense exemplification of the energy
and engagement such an ideal of openness to particularities should demand,
its text and notes providing challenging and enlightening juxtapositions of
unruly particulars and thoughtful interpretations. Yet however much one is
inclined to accept such major claims as that Elizabethans habitually interpreted plays according to local topicality, that they would have experienced difficulties reconciling rule by a female monarch with widespread fears of female misrule, that One Henry VI suggests a very ambivalent, and perhaps locally interventionist, evaluation of female power in the figure of joan of AIc,
that Cymbeline stages aspects of james's struggles for union of England and
Scotland, that Measure for Measure continues jurisdictional conflicts local to
London of 1604, the specific particularities marshalled in Puzzling Shakespeare
to support these and related points are sometimes far more open to dispute
than the book acknowledges.
So, for example, the assertion that "in 1601, a sudden rash of performances of Shakespeare's Richard II was taken by Elizabeth and her chief
ministers (and not without reason) as propaganda for the Essex rebellion" (p.
27) functions to close off a remarkable number of "local".openings. As recent
work by Leeds Barroll has reminded us, a single, apparently unique, commissioned performance in 1601 of an apparently Shakespearean, apparently long
unperformed, play about Richard II is apparently not taken by Elizabeth's
ministers-at least in surviving evidence-as attempted propaganda, but is
described as illustrating, according to Bacon's official Declaration the voyeuristic desire of Essex's associate Gilly Merricke to "satisfy" his eyes "with the
sight of that tragedy, which he thought soon after his lord should bring from
the stage to the state." Or, for a rather different example, the claim that
Henry VI exhibits "insistent" similarities (p. 69), "highly charged details" or
"potentially explosive details" (p. 68) that constitute "strong topical associations between joan and Elizabeth" (p. 76) and would affect the audience with
"immediacy and shock" (p. 93) turns out to rest upon the following particularities: (1) joan is a powerful woman who claims divine support, rules men,
and dons armour; Elizabeth is a powerful woman who claims divine support,
rules men, and may have once donned a "cuirass" (pp. 54-66); (2) joan is a
sham virgin who is burnt while claiming to carry an unborn child: Elizabeth
was rumored to have secret lovers and bum her unwanted offspring (p. 71);
(3) joan names as lovers the dukes of A1en~on and Anjou: Elizabeth comes
close to marrying the dukes of A1en~on and Anjou (p. 68); (4) joan is called
"Amazon," "Debora" and "Astrea's Daughter" by Dauphin Charies, who
promises to celebrate her in festival; Elizabeth is celebrated with festivals and
her designations include Amazon, Debora, and Astrea (p. 67); (5) "Catholic"
Joan thwarts "Protestant" English forces: Elizabeth fails to support Continental Protestantism to the extent demanded by ultra-Protestants (p. 74); (6) joan
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consorts with demons: Elizabeth's enemies accuse her of witchcraft (p. 81).
The author wisely admits "it is hard to judge whether the play would have
registered with contemporaries as subversion or containment of subversion"

(p. 83), and yet through pages of text and notes the claim that these would be
"insistent" parallels for contemporaries is scarcely open to dispute, although
that very insistence might be one of our most serious and localizable doubts.
(Compare the later claim: "Given the Elizabethan passion for political lockpicking, we can imagine various ways in which Shakespeare's cross-dressed
comic heroines could have registered with contemporary audiences as analogues of Elizabeth" [pp. 98 ff.]).
Such instances of interpretive formulation dominating particularities are
not isolated but reflective of a pervasive problematic that is perhaps most
striking in the book's treatment of Elizabeth at Tilbury. Elizabeth's inspirational appearance before the troops at Tilbury in 1588, which according to
some accounts included her wearing of a "cuirass," is convincingly related to

the queen's typical rhetorical strategy of claiming for her princely identity
both male and female natures and qualities. But while the book's further argument is based on a reasonable hypothesis-a ruling woman displaying
male attributes might have been threatening for her subjects in her embodiment of "a complex of attributes associated with danger and 'misrule'" (p.
62)-the claims that follow are far from convincing. The reasonable "local"
hypothesis generates by way of extremely slender evidence such locutionary
certainties as the designation of Elizabeth's appearance as "Elizabeth's glorious, troubling appearance at Tilbury" (p. 66) or "the dazzling, enervating
image of the queen at Tilbury" (p. 92) as well as such further reaches of hypothesis as the conjecture of "contemporary fears" that "the queen's anomalous self-display as a male warrior had in some mysterious fashion drained
away the efficacy of the English forces" (p. 82). The author admits that in
1588 discomfort about "the queen's violation of sex roles was apparently not
articulated, at least not in public" (p. 65), and that even a Spanish agent fails
to report "any word spoken of her, but in praising her for her stately person,
and princely behaviour" (p. 64), and yet the book argues for "local" uneasiness about Elizabeth's appearance on the basis of "menacing overtones" that
"register suppressed anxiety over the uncanny image of the queen in warlike
male attire" (p. 64), which the author reads in a single murky simile in James
Aske's laudatory Elizabetha Triumphan •. Thus does local interpretation-perhaps rather more like other readings than its ideal of openness to provisionality and historical particularity would suggest-read in the interests of a
generalized thematics local to the interpreter.
Those of us who have attempted to practice one or another form of localized reading may take heart from the lucid and compelling depiction of the
premises and potential of such reading as represented in Puzzling Shakespeare, but one may also here acquire a sense of problems that haunt its practice. Other locales have a disturbing tendency to turn into refracted versions
of our own backyard, no less subject to being fenced-in and tamed for all our
professed commitments to openness and provisionality.

Boston University

James R. Siemon
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Ben Jonson's Parodic Strategy: Literary Imperalism il1 the Comedies by Robert N.
Watson. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987. Pp. 269.
$25.00
Robert Watson's study is a lively, intelligent, largely successful exploration
of Ben Jonson's metadramatic impulse, anti-theatricalism, and emulous attitude toward rival dramatists. Like other strong, second-generation playwrights in the late Elizabethan-early Jacobean era, Jonson self-consciously
assumed a confrontational stance toward his dramatic predecessors and coevals and the genres they favored. In his most important comedies, Watson
argues, Jonson asserts his superiority over past playwrights and sovereignty
over contemporary playwrights by systematically debunking, decentering,
and generally devaluing their genres while fore grounding and prizing his
own. Jonson carries out this program of systematic self-promotion and generic revaluation through what Watson identifies as a thoroughgoing "parodic strategy," the variations thereon and permutations thereof the book is at
pains to document.
Fundamental to Jonson's purpose is the notion of genre as gestalt, that is,
as a self-contained system with its own values, mores, and assumptions
about reality. The panoply of fools that people Jonson's comedies are notable, Watson contends, because their ridiculous mind-sets are reduced, simplified, or parodic versions of popular Elizabethan literary and dramatic genres.
Jonson's audience would immediately recognize these "kinds," associate
them ignominiously with fools and gulls, and eventually reject them (together with their embodiments) in favor of the superior values and vision of
reality promoted by the character, usually a "wit," who is self-conscious
about his theatricalism and therefore privileged as Jonson's surrogate. This
trick of characterization enables Jonson simultaneously to satirize the selffashioning tendencies of London would-be's-aspirants to economic, social,
and amatory success or smug pretenders to intellectual, moral or religious
superiority-and, by parodying the genres he relegates to these fools, to discredit the work of predecessors and rivals while asserting his own sovereignty over the London stage.
It should be said at the outset that Watson's broad thesis about Jonson's
parodic strategy and literary imperialism is not wholly convincing. To begin
with, Watson never makes clear exactly what Jonson is imposing imperialistically on his dramatic worlds. In Every Mal1 /rI His Humour, the triumphant,
subsuming genre is described as a "realistic and ethical type of comedy" (p.
19), a version of new comedy with a naturalistic, moralistic, and satirical coloring that anticipates city comedy. But when we are told that in Every Man
Out of His Humour Jonson is already exhibiting an "ambivalence toward [his]
parodic strategy" (p. 49), and when in CYrIt"ia's Revels and Poetaster he reveals a "discomfort" , . .rith being a city comedian and in Eastward Ho the
"strategy" really doesn't fit (pp. 80-82), and when in the ending of Volpone
the satirical perspective of the , ..'its is emphatically un-privileged-it is clear
that \Vatson has claimed too much. \\'hat "strategy"? \Vatson has read a series of plays against his own critical construct.
But \Vatson's thesis-while too abstract systematic, and appliqued a construct to be convincing in its own terms-does provide access to the mctadra-
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matic and parodic impulse everywhere evident in Jonson's best plays and, as
a vehicle to critical insight, succeeds admirably, sometimes brilliantly. Every
Man In His Humour, Volpone, The Alchemist, and The Devil Is an Ass, for example, are especially well suited to an approach that highlights the characters' antithetical motives and assumptions that are allowed to jostle for ascendancy on the stage of fools before Jonson finally asserts the superiority of
another vision of reality, whether Brainworm's, or Lovewit's, or Wittipors, or

that of severe poetic justice his censors would impose on the world of Volpone. And even in plays where the conflict of genres and ultimate triumph of
a privileged genre is not at all evident, parody does seem central to Jonson's
dramaturgy, and Watson's approach pays rich dividends in illuminating what
makes discrete characters tick-such as Old Knowell (pp. 22-25) and Kitely
(p,p. 31-37), Macilente (pp. 74-78), Celia and Bonario (pp. 90-93), Morose
(pp. 107-10), Surly (pp. 125-29), or Overdo (pp. 156-68), to name a few of
Watson's most instructive assessments.
Since much of Jonson's parody in the comedies is of poetic genres, one
might have expected a chapter on Jonson the poet, establishing his complex
relationship to classical predecessors [Jonson as a pietistic "curator" (p. 9) of
the past is too simple1and contentious relationship with contemporaries. And
since Watson's "hope" is "to encourage further thinking about both the tactics and philosophy of jonson's entire artistic project" (p. 14), certainly he
ought to have been conversant with Helgerson's Self-Crowned Laureates,
which would have occasioned Watson's own "further thinking" about the
nature of Jonson's self-assertion. Still, these oversights notwithstanding, Ben
Jonson's Parodic Strategy is a valuable addition to Jonson scholarship and
highly recommended for students of Elizabethan-Jacobean drama in general.

University of Southern California

Richard S. Ide

One Flesh: Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton by
James Grantham Turner. Oxford: Oarendon Press, 1987. Pp. 320. $55.00,
cloth.
If you liked The Politics of Landscape (as I did), you will love One Flesh. It is
an example of how excellent work is being done while the arid theoretical
controversy about the new historicism preoccupies writers for and readers of
PMLA, SAQ, and NLH. At once a cultural historian and a literary critic who
orients his book toward a major canonical author, Turner is one of the scholars who address major texts in a wide cultural field, made up of seventeen
centuries of opinion on questions of sexuality, gender, and constructions of
human identity. To approach the representation of the relationship of Adam
and Eve in Paradise Lost, Turner summons interpretations of Edenic sexuality,
gender-relations, and interpretation of the Word from "the Church Fathers,
the Radical Reformation, Renaissance Platonism, and English Puritanism" (p.
vi). This book about a classical topic could not, however, have been written
until Turner could draw on recent critical theories that inform his work: reception theory in successive interpretations of Genesis, feminist theory for
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gender construction and defence of male supremacy, the concept of Genesis
as an indeterminate text, and the analysis of conflicting ideologies-all marshalled for a context in which to read a complex Milton, divided along several mentalities.
Each chapter addresses a part of "this problematic inheritance." The first
chapter defines central issues of the contradictions within Genesis, of the interpretations of Paradisal sexuality, of questions of trust in human reason and

imagination, and these concerns are traced throughout the Christian era. The
next two chapters concentrate on sexuality and sexual politics, beginning
with Augustine, but concentrating largely in the Reformation thinkers and
the ideologies of Milton's contemporaries. Another chapter is devoted to visionary and libertine theories of primeval sexuality in the seventeenth cen-

tury. The final chapters are addressed to Milton's divorce tracts and to Edenic
sexuality in Paradise Lost.
Turner demonstrates with engaging detail the range of interpretations of
Paradisal marriage and fallen sexuality in the longer tradition, but especially
in the seventeenth century: "Genesis could thus inspire wildly different conclusions and consequences, ranging from quietism to activism, from restitutionist fervour to alienated despair. No consensus or doctrine emerged to reg-

ulate this unpredictable variation-a lack which helps to explain the unstable, schismatic quality of Christianity, especially in the seventeenth century"
(p. 7). Large questions of imagining the unfallen state of Adam and Eve, of
married sexuality in the fallen world as an "Eden of felicitie," of imagining
the original marital relationship as egalitarian or subordinationist, are read

through Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Spiritual Libertines, Adamites, Ranters,
Boehme, and van Helmon!. But Turner's "Christian tradition" is anything but
the monolithic concept of past scholarship: "I see this tradition as profoundly
and incurably restiess, condemned perpetually to shuttle between dichotomies that it must raise but cannot solve: between a beatific and tragic sense
of life, between a lapsarian and a non-lapsarian view of human nature, be-

tween a redemptive and a diabolical vision of sexuality . . . between the
equality of all believers and the ratification of hierarchy by the 'Father,' and
above all between two meanings of 'one flesh/-evil substance, divine incar-

nation" (p. 8).
Turner's Christian tradition is not only profoundly contradictory and divided, but his presentation of Milton's English contemporaries is similarly
"thick" in description. Yoking Milton's magisterial epic to William Heale's An
Apologie for Women (1608) or Emilia Lanier's Salve Deus Rex Judeorum (1611)
simply would not have happened in earlier Milton studies, yet, as Turner
comments, "Paradise Lost is generated out of essentially the same materials"
(p. 2). The Milton that emerges from this heritage and from this context is
memorable: "I see him as a figure of abundance rather than inhibition, a heroic synthesizer of incompatible materials, continually engaged in the imaginative transcendence of conceptual limits. But I also show him deeply divided between radical and conservative mentalities, between Platonist idealism and psychological realism, between dualistic rejection and monistic
acceptance of the phYSical world, and between patriarchal and egalitarian
conceptions of Paradisal marriage" (p. ix). The same historical abundance,
synthesis of incompatible materials, and transcendence of conceptual limits
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Turner admires in Milton, the reader may also find in Turner's work. One
cannot think about Genesis or read Paradise Lost in the same way after this
book: read One Flesh.

Wayne State University

Marilyn L. Williamson

Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writings, 1649-1688 by Elaine Hobby.
London: Virago, 1988. Pp. x + 269. £11.95 paperback. Ann Arbor: Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1989. $29.95, cloth; $11.95, paper.
This is a timely and useful book, based on thorough research and dealing
with an important period of women's history. In 1640 censorship broke
down in England, and access to print was suddenly easier than before. There
was an astonishing outburst of publication by people to whom the press
would previously have been closed. Men took advantage of this more than
women: but gradually taboos on publication by women were broken down,
and a quite new era began. Women were being drawn into political activity
during the crisis of the civil war-petitioning for peace, for social and political reform. Simultaneously the breakdown of the church's monopoly permitted congregations of ordinary people to gather, unsupervised by a universityeducated minister, and to discuss whatever they wanted to discuss-religion,
politics, economics, marriage.
In these congregations women played an important part. Some preached,

drawing their own congregations; others participated in discussions. In some
sects women had their own separate meetings. There were many Biblical precedents for women prophesying; they were thought to have special supernatural gifts, whether as prophetesses or as witches. More than half the texts
published by women in her period, Elaine Hobby tells us, were prophecies
(p. 26). Elizabeth Poole was received by the leaders of the Army in December
1648, when she brought them a message of encouragement from the Lord.
Their interest in her subsided later when she told them that God did not
want them to execute the King. Anna Trapnel underwent trances, during
which she dictated reams of verse which her admirers eagerly wrote down.
There were many others.
Elaine Hobby has discovered three forgotten women poets. The anonymous author of Elizas Babes, or the Virgins Offspring (1652) has a remarkable
freshness of expression:
Since you ask me, why born was 17
I'll tell you; 'twas to heaven to fly,
Not here to live a slavish life,
By being to the world a wife.
(p.56)
But those that grovel here below,
What! I love them? I'll not do so.
(p.57)
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Eliza for, ask now not here,
She's gone to heaven, to meet her peer.
For since her Lord on earth was dead,

What, tarry here? she'd not, she said.
And to the heavens she took her flight.
(p.56)
All you that goodness do disdain,
Go, read not here:

And if you do; I tell you plain,
I do not care.
For why? above your reach my soul is placed,
And your odd words shall not my mind distaste.
(p.56)
But Elaine Hobby's object is not to reveal unknown literary masterpieces, but
to cover all women's writing during her chosen period-good, bad and indifferent. The great names are here-the Duchess of Newcastle, Lucy Hutchinson, Katherine Philips, Aphra Behn; but the book covers female prophets,
and prophecies, conversion narratives, books on housewifery, medicine, midwifery, education as well as literature proper. She rightly emphasizes that liberty of printing during the "Puritan" Revolution saw the beginnings of
"home-grown pornography" (pp. 86-88) as well as a translation of Areline.
Methods of birth control and abortion, presumably long transmitted by word
of mouth, got into print in the sixteen-fifties.
Il is in many ways a pity that her book starts in 1649-too late for the
main activities of one of the most colorful of radical women, the Leveller
Katherine Chidley (p. 69). Some women petitioners expressed very radical
views. The Womens Petition of 1650, employed the phraseology of Gerrard
Winstanley the Digger: the head of tyranny had been cut off with the execution of Charles I, but its body remained in the oppressive legal system which
derived from the Norman Yoke. Other women used the same metaphor and
made the same demands in October 1651 (p. 16). The Fifth Monarchist Mary
Cary called for legal reforms to give wives the right to own property, and
denounced the greed and idleness of the rich. She wanted a ceiling of £200 a
year on earnings-which would at a stroke have transformed society (p. 31).
Parliament's view of women's right to participate in politics was expressed in
1650; in prescribing those who must swear an oath of loyalty to the Commonwealth the word "persons" was changed to limen;" women were included in their husbands (p. 17).
The Quakers are important in this study, among whom women found
more freedom than in most groups. Elaine Hobby indeed plausibly suggests
that women like Sarah Blackborow and Elizabeth Hooton had already developed their ideas before the Quakers existed. George Fox made his first recorded interruption of a church service in support of women who had heckled the minister (p. 36). Quaker women countered the Pauline prohibition
of women's speaking in church by arguing that when Christ spoke in either
the male or the female he was not to be silenced. Fox took over this argument. Quaker women, like Quaker men, toured England denouncing minis-
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ters and universities, going naked for a sign; Quaker women missionaries set

off to convert the Great Turk and the Pope, or (far more dangerous) to convert Puritan New England. It must have been an extraordinarily liberating
experience for women thus to roam unaccompanied by men.

But the heroic age did not last long. The experience of defeat had a sobering effect on dissenters, and on women. Quaker women's meetings soon
came to devote themselves to "such things as are proper to us, as visiting
and relieving the sick;" the elder women instructed the younger "to be discreet, chaste, sober, keeping at home, that the work of God we profess be not

profaned" (p. 47). An Essay to Revive the Antient Education of Gentlewomen
(1673)-attributed to Bathsua Makin, though Elaine Hobby believes it was
written by a man-sums up: "God hath made the man the head, if you be
educated and instructed, as I propose, I am sure you will acknowledge it, and
be satisfied that you are helps, that your husbands do consult and advise
with you (which if they are wise they will be glad of) and that your husbands have the casting-voice, in whose determination you will acquiesce."
This, as Elaine Hobby concludes, "marks a retreat to quiescence, a retreat to

the home and the schoolroom: but a retreat armed with Latin and Greek, the
keys to male knowledge, and therefore the hope of not being defeated entirely" (p. 203). She rightly stresses that "under the developing bourgeoisaristocratic alliance of the later seventeenth century" only wealthy women
were able to write and publish. Their contribution was very different from
that of the political radicals of the revolutionary decades. "Their vision of
'womanhood' did not extend very far down the social scale" (p. 163).
A primary object of Elaine Hobby's book is to show how difficult it was for
women to publish, even after 1640. Traditionally women's role was to listen
to their fathers, husbands, and ministers. It was immodest, unfeminine, for

them to force themselves into male conversations. To write, let alone to publish, was far worse. Elaine Hobby shows the lengths of apology and pretence
to which women had to resort when they broke this taboo. "Finding myself
crowded into print with calumny and reproach, I was the rather prevailed
upon by some of my best friends not to be silent lest my innocency suffer. I
have therefore according to my capacity, in the plain style of a weak woman
(with all sincerity and meakness, however provoked).... " Thus Hester Shaw
in 1650, defending herself against her minister who had called her a "malicious slanderess" in print (p. 10). This is the point of Elaine Hobby's title:
Hester Shaw made a virtue of necessity. So did Mary Blathwaite in 1654,
who was persecuted by Cumberland royalists. "After much labour in vain,
and many a weary step, to no purpose," she felt that she had "to make myself a fool in print.... My oppressions are so great and so insufferable, that I
cannot do less than to crave for justice, from which I have been so long detained" (p. 15).
Twenty four years later, in the very different political atmosphere of the
Popish Plot, Elizabeth Cellier, who had been tmprisoned and attacked in ballads and pamphlets, still found it necessary to apologize for defending herseif, even to women. "As to my own sex, I hope they will pardon the errors
of my story ... though it be thought too masculine .... None can truly say
but that I preserved the modesty, though not the timouressness common to
my sex" (p. 23). Apology was necessary for entering into public controversy.
And great courage.
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Prophetesses could call upon a divine commission. Mary Cary in 1651 declared "I am a very weak and unworthy instrument, and have not done this
work by any strength of my own, but ... could do no more herein ... of
myself than a pencil or pen can do when no hand guides it" (p. 30). The author of Elizas Babes addressed God direct: "I dare not say, 'I am an ignorant
woman, and unfit to write,' for if thou will declare thy goodness and thy
mercy by weak and contemptible means, who can resist thy will?" (p. 55).
Authors of religious autobiographies, or of biographies of deceased husbands, could also claim to publish out of a sense of duty. But what of creative
writing-non-religious poetry, prose fiction, plays?
The first resort was one that gentlemen had often used-the author had
only written for friends, but manuscripts had been purloined and pirated by
unscrupulous printers. Katherine Philips, like male courtiers, circulated her
verses in manuscript to a privileged coterie. When they were printed in 1664
she felt it necessary to protest and apologize. But nevertheless she became
"an important example that it was pOSSible for a woman to be praised for her
writing, as long as she was sufficiently modest in her claims" (p. 142).
But she was not the first. In 1653 Margaret, Marchioness of Newcastle,
published Poems and Fancies. Elaine Hobby insists on calling her "Margaret
Cavendish." This is an amiably democratic way of referring to a lady who
from being Miss Lucas ultimately became a duchess. But-apart from the fact
that no one ever addressed her as "Margaret Cavendish" -her title was the
most important fact about her, even during the Revolution. A duchess can
flout convention as lesser women dare not. The Duke, remarkably and creditably, seems positively to have encouraged her literary undertakings, in which
he sometimes shared. With his approval she could be as eccentric as she
liked. So she blazed an important trail, continuing to publish poems, plays,
stories, philosophical essays and an autobiography as well as the famous life
of her husband. She helped to make it possible for women to go on publishing even "in the post-restoration world, where acceptable female behaviour
was again being narrowly defined" (p. 142). I share Elaine Hobby's disapproval of hereditary aristocracy; but I think the Duchess (and her husband)
deserves a niche among liberators of women.
The Duchess used her impregnable position to go over to the offensive.
"Since all heroic actions, public employments, powerful governments, and
eloquent pleadings are denied our sex in this age, or at least would be condemned for want of custom, is the cause I write so much" (p. 82). She
wanted to encourage women "lest in time we should grow irrational as idiots
by the dejectedness of our spirits, through the careless neglects and despisements of the masculine sex to the female, thinking it impossible we should
have either learning or understanding, wit or judgment." So women "are
kept like birds in cages, to hop up and down in our houses .... By an opinion, which I hope is an erroneous one, in men, we are shut out of all power
and authority, •.. we are never employed either in civil or martial affairs,
our counsels are despised and laughed at. ... Women that are bred together,
idie and ignorant (as I have been) are not likely to have much wit. ... It
were very fit and requisite they should be bred up to masculine understandings" (Philosophical and Physical Opinions, 1655). The Duchess was laughed
at; but she held her ground.
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Elaine Hobby is her own best critic. Most students of this period have regarded Aphra Behn as its most significant woman writer. Elaine Hobby is curiously ambivalent about her. "Her most well-known story, Oroonoko, sits
uneasily in my account of female romance." "The heroine's bravery in battle
and her subjection to the ever-present threat of rape" are all right, but the
central characters are black slaves, and the theme of white racism "introduces
a further set of issues which cannot be fitted into my argument. Both I and
others need to rethink our work on white women's writings to take account
of these concerns" (p. 96).
This is a characteristically honest and generous admission; it is also just.
Elaine Hobby might have been better able to fit Aphra Behn into her story if
she had appreciated how much men and women radicals had in common,
and had not tried to isolate the feminist issues as self-sufficient (d. p. 27).
Aphra Behn speaks up for women's equality. But she also wrote the first antislavery novel, and helped to create the myth of the noble savage. She shared
the anti-racialism of Roger Williams and the author of Tyranipocrit Discovered
(1649), the critical attitudes towards the Bible of Winstanley, Clement
Wrightly and Samuel Fisher. Her Love-Letters between a Nobleman and his Sister, which Hobby barely mentions, combines an attack on church marriage
with a defence of romantic love, both of which recall Milton. Some of the
best epigrams in her plays are directed against mercenary marriage-from
the point of view of both sexes, not exclusively from the woman's angle.
Hobby is admirable on aspects of Aphra Behn's plays which fit her interests.
But Behn was competing for a living, alone, in an aggressively male world.
This courageous book is full of information and new ideas. I have done
nothing like justice to its scope. It opens up whole new areas for discussion.
Elaine Hobby's own self-criticism is better than I can offer. In her last chapter, entitled "Beginning Again" she says she must think through the implications of race as well as gender; she hints at work on lesbianism, and advocates "a systematic search of posthumous works by men" which might "reveal much forgotten women's writing" (pp. 205-6). This work is already a
splendid beginning: she can and will take its insights further.

Sibford Ferris, Oxon.

Christopher Hill

Divided Fictions: Fanny Burney and Feminine Strategy by Kristina Straub. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1987. Pp. viii

+ 237. $22.00.

The contradictory nature of the late eighteenth-century domestic novel is
the subject of Kristina Straub's study of Frances Burney's early writings. Until
the last decade, Burney tended to be patronized by literary critics, and Straub
has produced the first serious full-length critical work on this important
writer. The last ten years have seen efforts by scholars such as Patricia Meyer
Spacks, Judith Newton, Susan Staves, and Mary Poovey to give Burney's
place in the development of the English novel its due, and Straub's work has
been followed by the publication of Margaret Anne Doody's literary biography of Burney (Frances Burney: The Life in the Works, Rutgers University
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Press, 1988) and by my own critical study (The Iron Pen: Frances Burney and
the Politics of Women's Writing [Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1989]) as
well as by a wave of welcome new, predominantly feminist, readings of Burney's fiction. Finally, then, the writer who used to be thought of as a poor
woman's Jane Austen without Austen's irony has been granted her rights to
the laurel crown for having virtually invented the modem woman's novel.
Divided Fictions concerns itself with the literary version of Evelina's subtitle; this is the study of a young writer's entrance into the world. Three of the
book's seven chapters discuss Evelina; or, A Young Lady's Entrance into the
World (1778), Burney's first and best-known work of fiction, with one chapter
on her second novel, Cecilia; or, Memoirs of an Heiress (1782), one chapter on
Burney's conceptions of her audience in her novels, journals and letters, and
one chapter Straub calls a "coda" that extends these feminist readings to Burney's last two novels, Camilla; or, A Picture of Youth (1796) and The Wanderer;
or, Female Difficulties (1814). In addition, Straub provides a useful opening
chapter concerning her use of the methodologies of feminist criticism.
Straub posits a crucial doubleness in Burney's juxtaposed depictions of female autonomy and female self-doubt. She explains the divided and "apparently self-contradictory" nature of Burney's writings by arguing that this doubleness, far from representing either duplicity or subversion, instead derives
honestly from the ideological inconsistencies and gaps in Burney's "cultural
circumstances as woman and writer" (p. 3). It is too easy, Straub believes, to
resolve the tension in Burney's work by seeing it either as a challenge or a
submission to ideological conformity. Instead, Straub uncovers "the constant
welling up-and, hence, exposure-of contradiction between the two opposing ideological impulses of Burney's duplicitous desires-to be human and a
woman" (p. 5). Burney's texts are in fact, Straub argues, divided against
themselves, and we must give up our worship of aesthetic unity and cease to
look for coherent political or aesthetic statements if we are to understand the
operations of Burney's art.
Straub turns most of her attention to Evelina "because it most clearly reveals the genesis of Burney's strategies for gaining 'unfeminine' control over
self-identification while retaining the traditional power of femininity-the
power of the 'other,' the romantic 'treasure,' .. ,-a kind of control that is all
too likely to recoil on its user" (p. 7-8). Straub's readings themselves are cogent and insightful; she is especially good on specific characters and passages. For example, Straub interprets the infamous footrace in the last volume of Evelina as part of the novel's complex metaphor of "gaming"-the
old women mirror physically the economic and psychic exploitation of their
sexually desirable younger selves, and the whole scene represents a "structured play, a kind of emblem for social interaction" (p. 44). Straub is also
good on the "moral chaos" (p. 29) of Evelina's rowdy and appealingly vulgar
grandmother Madame Duval, on the Mirvans' marriage and "the everyday,
garden-variety pathos of attempting to defend familiar serenity and sanity
against a culturally powerful male's disruptive behavior" (p. 61), and on the
complicatedly free Mrs. Selwyn, whose liberation from immediate male control is counteracted by her desire to dominate the novel's male wits (p. 27).
Straub uses the conventional plot outlines of Evelina to analyse the ideological functions and realities of marriage in the eighteenth century, and sug-
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gests that while Burney used her writing to manipulate conventions for her
own wish-fulfillment, "Evelina's happy ending should not blind us to the
implied, though ultimately incomplete, plot of the heroine's negative progress toward emotional deprivation, the barren realms of institutionalized failure" (p. 77). She contrasts Burney's own complex ties to her father with the
Oedipal impulses of Evelina's relations to Villars and Orville, and offers an
interesting alternative to the deprecating view (first proposed, with some personal justification, by Germaine de Stael) that Burney was a perpetual adolescent by proposing that it is no wonder, given the prevailing comparisons
between carefree youth and the trials of maturity and marriage, that any
woman would wish to prolong the former state.
Straub's strongest chapter on Evelina concerns what she calls "trivial pursuits": middle-class women's everyday occupations. Deftly using Pope's Belinda and Swift's Dorinda and Celia as cultural figures of feminine action,
Straub refers work-play activities such as needlework and the bodily artificiality of the toilette to the contradictory ideologies Burney uncovers in her
depiction of the constant devaluation of women's pastimes. In Evelina, Burney's stance, according to Straub, is one of "guileless duplicity"; without intending to deceive, she is trapped by "a contradiction inherent in the ideological terms of eighteenth-century, middle-class female self-identification"
(p. 82). Evelina's situation differs measurably from the situations of Cecilia,
Camilla, and Lady Juliet Granville, in that she is never entirely on her own,
and the analysis Straub offers of "trivial pursuits" and the economy that underlies them might be profitably turned to an understanding of the later novels.
Straub reads Cecilia in part within this framework, but her emphasis is on
the relation of what she sees as its dual plot structure, weaving a conventional romance plot with a "Rasselas-like" (p. 110) search for an appropriate
life's work for the middle-class woman. The love plot, Straub believes, eventually decenters the public and economic themes of the novel. One of the
strengths of this chapter is its analysis of the story of Albany, a bizarre and
deliberately unsettling character whose transgressive past can easily be overlooked in a casual reading. Straub demonstrates the centrality of his story to
the novel, and makes use of the recent work by Terry Castle and Mary Russo
on the carnivalesque to read the importance of the masquerade in Cecilia. Finally, she concludes, Cecilia fits into the trajectory of Burney's writing career
by "chart[ing] the contradictions between romantic love and a course of life,
between affection and work, personal autonomy and social duty, as part of
the identity [Burney] dermes for herself through her fiction" (p. 151).
The place of the act of writing itself in Burney's self-definition forms the
subject of Straub's chapter on "The Receptive Reader and Other Necessary
Fictions." She argues here for an understanding of Burney's analysis of
woman as text: to know Evelina is to read her letters; to know Frances Burney is to be her reader. This notion leads to a useful and Original interpretation of the mother's posthumous letter in Evelina, where the heroine's
mother appears only as disembodied words on a page many years after her
death. Straub carries this to its logical endpoint and interprets reading (and,
therefore, misreading) as central to all Burney's novels, arguing that activities
such as Cecilia's and Camilla's "running mad" are rhetorical acts, "a way of
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naming the threat of self-victimization implicit in acts of female power in the
context of a male-controlled society" (p. 176). In each of Burney's novels,
Straub holds, a central moment of crisis occurs when the heroine fails to receive a just "reading" and her own self-alienation results.
While the focus of Divided Fictions is on the beginnings of a woman's literary career, Straub offers provocative readings of Burney's last two novels,
with especially useful analyses of the importance of clothing and of crossdressing in both novels, and sections on Sir Hugh's complicit role in Camilla
and on theatricality in The Wanderer. This chapter teases the reader a little.
Straub never claims to pay the kind of attention to these novels that she does
to Cecilia and especially to Evelina, but their inclusion here takes some of the
book's emphasis away from its goal of interpreting beginnings rather than
discussing an entire literary career. Still, Straub fits the later novels into her
argumentative frame, concluding that lithe dissonances of Burney'S fiction
reveal not aesthetic failure but an impressive ability to resist false unities and
resolutions designed to mask the real difficulty of her historical and personal
circumstances. Burney's novels body forth contradiction, allowing her power
over her identity as a woman writer and giving her the ability to confront her
audience with the often-painful evidence of the difficulty in sustaining that
identity" (p. 181).
From her analyses of Burney's self-division, Straub concludes that "Burney
did not have the political consciousness to bring her intuitions about the debilitating effects of male-centered ideology on women's lives to the point of
explicit social critique" (p. 33); that her "historically determined inability to
do more than expose the contradictions in the ideology that shaped her sense
of female maturity-the conflict between a happy-ever-after romantic marriage and the depressing 'gulphs, pits, and precipices' of futurity-left her
vulnerable to debilitating self-doubts from which a more fully conscious critique of received ideology might have protected her" (p. 51); and that Burney's "creative energy did not run to criticizing the informing assumptions of
female life, but to revealing, without resolving, basic contradictions within
ideology" (p. 107). Though no scholar would argue that Burney rivalled
Mary Wollstonecraft as a feminist political theorist, these statements undervalue the courage and political power of exposing, as Straub's analyses deftly
demonstrate, the culturally imperilled and socially constrained situation of
women in the late eighteenth century. The social critique in Evelina is veiled
by the gauze of broad humor and subtle wit, though in the later novels, as
Straub shows, that critique is pointed. Indeed, Cecilia, Camilla, and The Wanderer provide as sharp and angry and telling a depiction of the "wrongs of
woman" as anything written during the period.
Burney's fictions challenge social ideology and work to disrupt convention
at the same time that they ultimately reintegrate their heroines into conventional social structures. The central (and vexed) question for feminist critics
interested in the complex politics of these fictions concerns authorial ~nten
tion and responsibility. Until recent ,,"ork on Jane Austen began to propose a
more overtly political understanding of her work, Austen critics resolved the
problem with arguments about the aesthetics of irony. But Burney is a far
darker and angrier \\'Titer than Jane Austen. Burney's novels participate in the
political gothicism of the late century, and her narrative strategies are "femi-
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nine" within a context of revolutionary social and political change. poes her
patina of propriety cover deliberate subversion? Or is she truly self-divided,
wanting to be acceptably decorous yet producing fiction and drama that push
against the borders of decorum? The richness of Burney's later work lies in its
very forcefulness. The strength of Kristina Straub's Divided Fictions is that it
presents the genesis of Burney's narrative and political power in her youthful
efforts to have things both ways, to be a reformer as well as an observer.
Divided Fictions makes a plea for recognizing the complexity, subtlety and
seriousness of Burney'S fiction, and of the particularly female power in its
analysis of the eighteenth-century's ideological thwartings of female desire.
Kristina Straub's reading of Burney'S entrance into the literary marketplace
offers an analysis of a single writer that fits with the recent more theoretical
and general work of Nancy Armstrong, Mary Poovey, and Leonore Davidoff
and Catherine Hall. A lot must necessarily be omitled from this study because of its primary concern with literary entry-Straub mentions Bumey's
career as a playwright only in relation to the aborted The Witlings, for example-and readers will disagree with some points and wish for further elaboration of othersr but Divided Fictions raises some crucial issues concerning our
critical treatment of writers who cannot comfortably fit a political agenda.
What did it mean for this SOcially constrained woman to insist on a career for
herself as a writer, to make public her insidiously dangerous analyses of her
social world? The first responsibility of a critical study is to ask the important
questions, and Divided Fictions does that.

Haverford College

Julia Epstein

Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment, edited by G. S. Rousseau and Roy
Porter. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1988. Pp. x + 280.
$35.00.
"It is tempting to write the history of sex as if all in darkness lay till God
said 'Let Freud be' and all was light" (p. I). One might easily purloin this
rather successful opening one-liner from Rousseau and Porter and, in the
place of Freud, substitute Foucault. However, one of the main virtues of this
collection of ten essays is that, while it acknowledges and draws on Foucauldian revisionism, it favours "nitty_gritty historical research" before his
preferred "bird's-eye view" (p. 64). The editors are concerned with inclusivity as a criterion for truer history. Hence their plan for two further volumes in
this series dealing respectively with the Orient and with "sex, discourse and
society in Western Europe" (p. ix).
The impressive scope of the research in this first volume, ranging from
Randolph Trumbach on London prostitution to Gloria Flaherty on Shamanism in Africa, offers a welcome contribution to the contextualisation of our
understanding of sexuality in the period. Porter and Rousseau seem needlessly defensive about the admirably "greater eclecticism" which characterises their selection of primary sources (p. vii). In an ill-placed reversion to canonical standards, they plead not to "be adjudged to be second-rank" for
studying "second rank or lower" authors (p. 9).
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Lawrence Stone is rebuffed for his invalidation of Paul-Gabriel Bouce's
forerunning Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain because he arrogantly dismisses it as written by mere "scholars of English literature" (p. vii). Despite
the largely democratic approach to all texts in the body of their book however, Porter and Rousseau momentarily seem to hanker for more supposedly
objective documents, somehow magically devoid of the ideological influence
of discursive practices. They appear to deny the spilling over of the "self-referential play upon ... itself" which they regard as characteristic of "art,"
into texts that fall beyond their categories of fiction and the visual arts (p. 9).
In an effort to guard against the cruder equations of art with '1ife or ...
mass ideology" they suggest a purely formal, perhaps even trans-historical,
and hermetically separate matrix for works of art (pp. 8-9). In practice
though, the essays (induding their own) elaborate circumstances of production and mentalities of reception thus gauging the way "art" and all manner
of texts interact with, and not simply react to, society. An awareness of this
constitutive relation leads to such interesting studies as that of Randolph
Trumbach investigating "Modem Prostitution and Gender in Fanny Hill ".
The novel in question is interrogated using Foundling Hospital petitions and
court records-the discourses of its social context.
Though the first contributor to Sexual Underworlds, Theodore Tarczylo, attacks the blinkered selectivity of a traditional movement in art history and literary criticism which, rather unhelpfully, translates from the French as "lascivious erudition," he gives us scant guidance in discovering an alternative
methodology (p. 27). For he dismisses "the new history" as a blunt "MarxoFreudian" instrument obsessively dependent on statistics which are then interpreted with no feeling for regional or cultural variations (p. 28). Antony
Simpson's later essay, associating notions about the curability and prevention
of venereal disease with the incidence of rape on minors, seems to challenge
Tarczylo in its highly informative and sensitive statistical and legal analysis.
Simpson's taut exposition also heeds the editors' warning about the increasingly "politicised, polarised and polemical" nature of "interpretations of
sex and sensuality" in the period (p. 6). While such a timely reminder against
self-indulgent ranting is welcome it seems neither possible nor desirable to
eradicate politicisation (in its broadest sense) from those interpretations. A
heightened awareness of the political contexts of the production of such "interpretations" as distinct from the political contexts of the period seems preferable to pretended impartiality in ensuring the least distortion of materials
under scrutiny.
In citing so-called "feminist sectarianism" as a contemporary source of undesirable politicisation, Rousseau and Porter leave their objections precariously unsupported (p. 6). Elsewhere too, "certain feminist scholars of the
1970's" are said to have "discovered a new model of the eighteenth-century
woman" (p. 15). But who are these scholars? No foot-note tells us. Similarly
unlisted "recent feminist historians" are accused of being "all too ready to
impose the role of victim upon women in the past" (p. 15).
While the dust-jacket boasts "a special focus" on "the sexual behaviour of
women," it is predominantly what other people (mostly men) wrote about
"the sexual behaviour of women" which features. Lynne Friedli's essay on
women who "passed" for men, and Terry Castle's discussion of travesty in
the period constitute the two chief exceptions to this comment.
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Even if we accept the scarcity of women's surviving writings and the bibliographical problems of recovering them, there are moments at which the
contributors unreasonably exclude the discussion of works by women.
Though Bouce discerns a "devious latent anti-feminist discourse" in his very
full exploration of concepts of the effect of the female imagination in pregnancy, he too readily dismisses female midwifery treatises as slavish copies
of their male counterparts without offering us proof or seeking to explain
why this might be so (p. 99). Porter too cites only male discussions of the
man-midwife, since women midwives allegedly reproduced only a "standard
litany of arguments" (p. 216).
While conveniently deciding that "this is not the place to adjudicate the issue" of whether male midwives constituted a regression for women, Porter
goes on to elaborate what amount to' counter-claims without fully facing the
"feminist" arguments he has dismissed in passing (pp. 216, 221). He ponders
the "choice" of male practitioners by women without considering the influences and controls that conditioned that so-called "choice" (p. 216). The implication that eighteenth-century suspicions of sexual relations between patient and practitioner diminish the modem view that male practitioners enhanced "patriarchal subordination" surely depends on an elusive notion of
female liberation (p. 221). To see the woman and man-midwife as allies in
concealing illegitimate births is a separate, less debatable matter but one
which, though he refers to it, Porter fails to distinguish in its implications.
Though the editorial introduction contains an intelligent reminder that any
projected "erotic golden age" may not be so "golden" for all sectors of society, there is a tendency to regard things from the masculine standpoint (p. 4).
Even Terry Castle alludes primarily to new sexual possibilities open to the
masquerading woman, but one might equally see these as opportunities
merely for the greater exploitation of bodies.
Any elision of the (mainly male) contributors' approach with the highly
objectifying nature of the texts explored towards women could be guarded
against by a more bold and systematic definition and use of the terms "pornography" and "erotica." Evidently such divisions and definitions constitute
a study in themselves, but to attempt a working definition, as Roger Thompson has done in his study of seventeenth-century pornography, Unfit for
Modest Ears (1979), might have strengthened their stance in a problematical
terrain. Simpson and Castle refer to "pornography," while Peter Wagner, discussing paramedical texts, prefers "erotic" and "erotica," rather alarmingly
labelling such "discourses" as "providing some sexual relief" without speculating on their negative effects more than to say that they offered "a mixture
of correct and false information" (p. 64).
Sexual Underworlds does however confront the "false" consciousness induced by previous effacements or avoidances of eighteenth-century discourses relating to homosexuality. Rousseau demonstrates compellingly the
significance of Richard Payne Knight's treatise on Priapic worship as a focus
of topical anxieties with its sub-textual attack on contemporary Christianity.
Yet, in discussing the related issue of Payne Knight's sexual orientation (irrespective of whether passive or active), he seems too ready to assert that
"contemporary psychologists and psychiatrists have shown that ... bisexuality or homosexuality consists of a symbolic transaction: the symbolic taking
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in of the father to assuage the pain of the mother" (p. 139). Surely this is
only one psychoanalytical model, not a conclusive and universal blueprint.
Furthermore it relies on an acceptance of the highly debatable Freudian construct of female as castrated male. His concluding references to "a golden age
of the phallus" invoke only the projected emancipatory aspects for the homosexual male, while he remains evasive of the less than "golden" ramifications of "phallicism" for women (p. 141).
In his wish to avoid reviving "a minor ancient work by endowing it with a
microscopic reading it probably does not deserve," Rousseau restates editorial anxieties (p. 103). For Rousseau and Porter feel compelled to defend
the exposition and description of little-known material in their volume,
thereby unfortunately inserting themselves in the over-stressed theory /antitheory paradigm. "We hope," they assert, "that in this era of Theory information has not sunk into such disrepute that fresh material can only be presented if it displays a new conceptual blueprint" (p. ix.). One is reminded of
Brown and Nussbaum's discussion of "the resistance to theory in Eighteenth
Century studies" in their introduction to The New Eighteenth Century (1987),
where they recognise that '"theory''' has become not only an occasion for a
certain amount of confusion, but a location of ideological struggle . . . for
many critics in this field" (p. 1).
Unnecessarily so one feels in the case of Sexual Undemorlds, since only
studies with the freshness and depth of those assembled by Rousseau and
Porter, can permit us to continue re-theorising models of eighteenth-century
sexuality, as these authors, despite the modesty of their introductory statements, have indeed begun to do.

Brasenose College, Oxford

Hero A. Chalmers

Blake and Spenser by Robert F. Gleckner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Univ.
Press, 1985. Pp. 416. $42.00
This book is a welcome attempt to find the most fruitful ground for comparing Spenser and Blake. Robert Gleckner approaches the poets by choosing
two general areas for analysis, the poets' systems of thought and Blake's visual depictions of Spenserian subjects. In his book's first half, he examines
Blake's criticism of the Amoretli's Petrarchan presentation of sexual roles, the
transformation of Spenserian temperance in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,
and Blake's general perceptions of the inadequacies of allegory as a mode of
poetic thought. The second half consists of a detailed analysis of Blake's tempera The Characters in Spenser's Faerie Queene; Gleckner elsewhere discusses
Blake's portrait of Spenser and Spenser Creating His Fairies, one of the illustrations for Gray's Bard.
The book has considerable virtues. Gleckner is best when reading Blake's
poetry closely, as in the chapter on Petrarchanism. He treats the Amoretti not
as an individual cycle but as an epitome of a larger Petrarchan tradition. Although, as he realizes, the Amoretti are more a criticism than an epitome of
that tradition, he claims that "with a studied and deliberate obtuseness Blake
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interprets the Amoretti ... as a kind of epitome of Petrarchan error ... " (p.
5). He argues convincingly that Blake's early poetry absorbs and literalizes
Petrarchan images to suggest the violence inherent in them, as in "The
Golden Net." By tracing Petrarchan images throughout Blake's work, he
demonstrates how the epics not only continue the earlier rejection of Petrarchanism but also revalorize its images, as in Milton's famous "Arrows of desire" and "Bow of burning gold."
muminating as Gleckner's close readings are, he is less successful in his
characterization of the overall relation between the two poets. For him, the
attitude taken by the narrator of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell toward Milton becomes a model for Blake's stance toward Spenser: ". . . we must find
evidence of Blake's turning the 'angelic' Spenser against himself to reveal the
devilish Spenser that was hid ..." (p. 26). This division into angelic and devilish, which Blake employs so cleverly in the Marriage, is less helpful as a
model for the progress of the relation between Blake and Spenser because it
threatens to tum Spenser into an ideological strawman. Noting that Blake
"hardiy needed" Spenser or Milton to find "benighted ideas" to attack,
Gleckner claims that for Blake, Spenser and Milton "should have known better" because they "were poets, not philosophers or theoreticans" (p. 86). He
is rightly uncomfortable locating the relation between Blake and Spenser in
the realm of "benighted ideas," and his last chapter warns eloquently against
reducing poets to doctrines.
Yet Gleckner does not always heed his own warnings. He argues that
Spenser is an "allegorist extraordinaire and therefore, to Blake, a devotee of
memory, reason, and the moral virtues" (p. 105). Blake's task is to free Spenser from the "intransigence of allegory" (p. 135) through his "allegorical antiallegory" (p. 133). Gleckner is certainly correct to point out that Blake's discussions of allegory as a mode are harshly critical; in Blake's poems the
adjective "allegorical" almost always has a pejorative sense. Yet the complex
spectrum of poetic levels of representation in both Blake and Spenser is not
adequately suggested by his neat division into Spenserian allegory and Blakean anti-allegory. Though The Faerie Queene contains moments of the kind of
flat allegory that Blake found so inadequate, Gleckner's premises rule out detailed investigation of how Blake responded not to the poem's moral teaching
but to its evolution of its own mythic structure. He overlooks how moments
of flat allegory, such as the House of Alma in Book II, are called into being as
contrasts to moments in the poem, such as the river-marriage near the end of

Book IV, that are hardly allegorical at all, at least not in the same sense.
What Blake may have learned from Spenser is that allegory can be the most,
not least, flexible of modes.
For Gleckner, "Milton's and Blake's superiority, in Blake's eyes, quite
rightly resides in the fact that they are 'generators' of values rather than conformers to those that already exist ... " (p. 150). He sets the radically revisionist Blake against the more traditionalist Spenser, whose poem allegorizes
only the received categories of virtue, and is impatient with attempts to read
Blake's poems as flat allegories, in which, for example, Urizen equals reason
in a simple one-ta-one correspondence. Yet our understanding of the relation

between narrative and abstraction must be as supple in Spenser as in Blake.
The historical definitions of the values to which Spenser, according to Gleck-
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ner, is supposed to conform, are of surprisingly little help in understanding
The Faerie Queene. Is chastity a feeling, activity, intellectual concept, physical
state, personal goal, communal ideal? It is all these, and Spenser's ability to
adapt the ground rules of his poetics to represent them is one source of Milton's famous praise of him as a "better teacher,"
Gleckner's treatment of the House of Busirane is characteristic of his special strengths and weaknesses: "'Thought alone can make monsters: Blake
once said very early in his career, 'but the affections cannot' (Annotations to
Swedenborg, E603). That saying is a measure of his unhappiness with Spenser, for Amoret's 'affections' are clearly her 'phantasies: products not merely
of her sexual fears but also of her imagination.... It is 'Thought' (Britomart)
that comes to her rescue as the monster-slayer rather than the monstermaker, a true knight 'errant' for Blake, since she is not merely Reason but
Chastity, the latter a 'monster' created by the former. No wonder Britomart
fares so badiy under Blake's furious brush in The Faerie Queene painting ... "
(p. 137). Britomart, for Gleckner's Blake, represents the repressive forces of
reason and chastity that conquer the dangerous forces of Amoret's "diseased
imagination" (p. 136) personified by Busirane. Gleckner suggests interestingly that Blake was troubled by Spenser's ambivalent attitude toward the
imagination and would have seen in such an episode a negative model of the
relation between imagination and reason. Yet if the House of Busirane is, as
he claims, a projection of Amoret's mind, it is equally a projection of Britomart's and Busirane's, a representation of the harmful power that masculine
conventions of love exercise over women, a revision of the Bower of Bliss,
and perhaps most importantly for Blake, an example of the dangers of becoming entrapped by imaginative systems. Gleckner's identification of Britomart with reason is puzzling, for little in her appearances in the poem connects her with reason, particularly the lifeless abstract reasoning that Blake so
often reacts against. The radical redefinition of chastity in terms of fidelity
that Britomart represents makes her less an ancestor of Rahab and Tirzah, as
Gleckner claims, than of Blake's Oothoon and Ololon, women who, like Britomart, make the painful transition from innocence to experience.
More attention to Milton's position in the Blake-Spenser relation would
also have been helpful. One of Gleckner's most valuable conclusions is that
Spenser's Book II is the most important for Blake, yet he pays too little attention to how Milton's own revision of Book II mediates between Blake and
Spenser. Gleckner discusses in detail Eumnestes's chamber in the House of
Alma, where Arthur reads the history of Britain, and Guyon that of Faery.
Yet he fails to note that at the climax of Comus, Milton returns to this moment and borrows from Spenser's history of Britain the story of Sabrina and
Gwendolen. Blake's own characterization of Gwendolen in Jerusalem involves a response to both of the earlier poets as complex as his images of
Los's furnaces. Gleckner bypasses these literary relations, so that Eumnestes's
chamber becomes for him merely a Blakean nightmare, a library devoted to
memory and history rather than to the imagination. He argues that Blake's
printing house in Hell in the Marriage reveals the negative implications of
Spenser's episode: "All these books and paintings, which Spenser himself
calls 'memorable,' are the very excrementitious husks that must be corroSively etched away in Blake's printing process to reveal the 'real' infinite wis-
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dam or 'history' that was hidden" (p. 110). Yet Guyon's history is Spenser's
myth, and the complex intersection between the two in The Faerie Queene
provides Blake's precedent in his own epics, which are never so bound up
with mythic imagination that British history is far from their center. He recalls Spenser's retelling of British history at the end of The Four Zoos:
Next Huddibras his realme did not encrease,
But taught the land from wearie warres to cease.
Whose footsteps Bladud following, in arts
Exceld at Athens all the learned preace,
From whence he brought them to these saluage parts,
And with sweet science mollifide their stubborne harts.
(lI.x.25)
... Urthona rises from the ruinous walls
In all his ancient strength to form the golden armour of science
For intellectual War The war of swords departed now
The dark Religions are departed & sweet Science reigns
(FZ 139:7-10, E407)
Blake follows Milton's lead in Comus by transforming a small episode from
Spenser's history and giving it climatic, redemptive significance. His development of the image of "sweet Science" from the learning of Athens into the
severe contentions of friendship becomes in itself a metaphor of those severe
contentions, a powerful example of how a later writer can expand and revitalize the vision of an earlier one.

Gleckner devotes over one-third of his book to a systematic, ambitious
analysis of Blake's tempera, The Characters in Spenser's Faerie Queene. In a
painstaking discussion, he demonstrates that the painting represents how
"Spenser's phantasmagoria of shifting identities seems to focus our attention
on the fallen world of Generation and its multifaced 'evils'" (p. 280) .. Despite
the intelligence of Gleckner's argument, I find this section the least satisfying
in the book because of a certain arbitrariness in the way Gleckner evaluates
the figures: "He [the poet-figure] is under a rainbow ... and that is obviously
good. But the rainbow seems to emanate from Jove's aurora borealis and ter-

minates, to our right, in the right wing of the spread-winged Presence; and
that is apparently bad" (p. 197). Much of the analYSis depends on an analogy
between this portrayal and Blake's more famous one of Chaucer's pilgrims;
Gleckner argues, for example, that the similarity of Britomart's figure to that
of the Wife of Bath's suggests that they are both representatives of RahabTirzah for Blake. No detailed consideration of how Blake might have viewed
the relationship between Chaucer and Spenser reinforces the equivalences he
finds between the two pictures. Yet one of Milton's most powerful images
suggests Blake's response to the relationship between the two: the "infusion
sweete" of Chaucer's spirit into Spenser's in Book IV of The Faerie Queene
provides Blake with a precedent for the image of Milton's spirit entering his
left foot.
While Gleckner is frequently perceptive and original in what he has to say
about Blake, he seems nervous about advancing original interpretations of
Spenser. He often appeals to previous Spenserian critics, as if for reassurance:
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"Only Una, as A. C. Hamilton observes, needfully reminding us of the obvious, 'cannot be divided in herself, being one'" (p. 147). The opportunity
that a comparison of Spenser and Blake could offer of developing a distinctive interpretation of each poet in light of the other does not emerge as often
or as powerfuliy as it might. He comes closest when he begins to unpack
Coleridge's notion of mental space, noting brilliantly that Blake's characters,
like Spenser's, seem "groping, lost, in the similar labyrinthine ways of their
own minds, gropings externalized and displayed in his version of a monster-,
dragon-, magician-, warrior-, damsel-, and villain-ridden landscape" (p. 265).
As Gleckner suggests, a mental space involves more than mere pictorial description. It is defined not only by how it looks but also by what surrounds it
in space and time, by events that have happened, might happen, and could
never happen there, and by its similarities to and differences from other
spaces in the poem. Near the opening of Jerusalem, Albion hides Jerusalem
on the banks of the Thames and Medway, a likely reference, as Gleckner
notes, to the river-marriage near the end of Book IV of The Faerie Queene. For
Gleckner, this episode "hardly suggests a sympathetic reading by Blake" of
Spenser's picture of concord in the natural world (p. 323). I agree that Blake's
treatment of the rivers suggests an agonistic revision of Spenser, but it also
demonstrates Blake's ability to see how context modifies the Significance of
Spenserian spaces. By following the river marriage with the harshness of
Book V, the Book of Justice, Spenser suggests that its mythic, natural concord
is only transient and must give way to the ugliness and discord that attend
the imposition of justice in a social world. In Jerusalem, Blake puts a Book IV
event, the marriage of the Thames and Medway, in the discordant context of
Book V, presenting simultaneously what Spenser presents sequentially. Blake
recognizes the Beulah world of the Thames and Medway as a figment of antiquated pastoral, but the setting he poses against it, the "incoherent despair"
of the world in chaos, has its precedent in Spenser as well.
What a detailed treatment of mental space might prOvide that Gleckner's
book does not is a sense of Blake the student of Spenser as well as Blake the
critic of Spenser. In both poets, the stable identity of a place is in tension
with the increasing layers of meaning that it acquires in a poem's wider context. Spenser's Bower of Bliss takes on new significance in relation to the
Gardens of Adonis. Both are beautiful gardens, but he transforms the negative, timeless world of the Bower into the vital, fertile one of the Gardens.
Blake's Beulah is both the Bower and the Gardens; he again presents as one
space the positive and negative spaces that are sequentially related in Spenser. Los's transformation of Gwendolen's falsehood in Jerusalem represents
Blake the student of Spenser at his most profound. The falsehood at first becomes "a Space & an Allegory" with a "tender Moon," a familiar Blakean
mock-pastoral like the Bower of Bliss. Unexpectedly, Los redeems the space
by planting in it "the Seeds of beauty," and it grows into the garden called
"Divine Analogy." The bower of Gwendolen's falsehood does not have to be
destroyed as the Bower of Bliss was. Rather, only from falsehood and the
"Winding Worm" can a more fertile place like the Gardens of Adonis spring.
The space is elected because of, rather than in spite of, the falsehood involved in creating it.
Gleckner's achievement is to point the way to such analysis; his consider-
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able ability to notice interesting clashes (and parallels) between the poets
makes his book worth reading for both Spenserian and Blakean scholars. Yet
his narrow concentration on Blake's intellectual mistrust of Spenser's supposedly conventional morality and reductive allegory occasionally diminishes
both poets. There are also a few small errors: Florimell does not pursue an
"endless flight" (p. 147) throughout the poem, but marries Marinell in Book
V; on page 155, he seems to think that Spenser wrote the introductory epistle
to The Shepheardes Calender, but there is considerable debate about whether
its author, E. K., was Spenser. But these are minor points; on the whole,
Gleckner's successes are provocative and his failures instructive. They provide a foundation on which others can and should build.

Yale University

Andrew Elfenbein

Tennyson and the Doom of Romanticism by Herbert F. Tucker. Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. ix

+ 481. $37.50.

This book is a most impressive achievement in close reading and in what
its author calls "specifically literary biography" (p. 9). Limiting himself to the
first part of Tennyson's career, the poetry from the Juvenilia to "Maud"
(1855), Tucker undertakes to demonstrate thematic and rhetorical constancy
as well as development and change in Tennyson's work in the years between
1828 and 1855. Among the book's rewards is the unusual attention given to
Tennyson's unpublished poetry and to the poems of 1832, as well as to some
of the idylls: less often discussed poetry that is treated here in its own right
and not as a mere propaedeutic to the later, more famous works. The result is
a plotting of Tennyson's career that Tucker derives from the pervasive sense
of doom, the foreclosure of possibilities for self-existence, that Tennyson was
repeatedly negotiating in his writing. This negotiation is a habit Tennyson
adopted early on and never released. The later poetry reveals this sense of
doom to have a wider range of meaning than the intensely private early
poems may have suggested, but the fundamental mood of Tennyson's work
-and Tucker makes clear that Tennyson's is a work of atmosphere and
mood-goes unchanged. As such, it is not surprising that the literary self,
whether Tennyson's or his speaker's, is a crucial, if finally somewhat problematical, category in this book.
So thorough is Tucker's exegesis of Tennyson's texts and so careful is he of
their place in English literature and culture, that it is difficult to imagine this
book being soon surpassed as a presentation of the first half of Tennyson's
career. Yet this is a book without an explicit critical program. As I shall explain, that has advantages as well as disadvantages. Positively, it means that
Tucker can pursue as freely as possible the full internal complexities of Tennyson's development and thus serve his end of literary biography. Negatively, however, it gives the impression of a reluctance on the author's part to
draw the final consequences of his own exemplary groundwork. Let us look
first at that groundwork.
Tucker's approach to his task is instructive and consequent. Calling Tenny-
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son's "a poetry of aftermath" and referring to the poet's "fascination with
inevitability," he notes that this "retrograde approach," more than describing
the familiar Victorian belatedness, describes as well the poet's own method
of composition: "In Memoriam" is only the most famous example of a Tennyson poem that knew a "backward genesis" (pp. 13, 12). Even when not literally writing backwards, the poet preferred to give poems a retrospective
cast. It is this temporal mode which brings out a certain recognizable quality
of character and voice in Tennyson-call it social reluctance, introversion,
preoccupied gloom-and diminishes others.
Since time flows backwards in Tennyson, the past inevitably looms before
his subjects as the locus of power, the prior scene of decisive events and actions. Whereas the present is characterized by passivity and inertia, the past
is determining. The consequences of this for Tennyson's work are extensive:
description replaces narrative, mood action. Characters are passionately responsive, displaying all degrees of affect but little ethical sense (pp. 14-17).
The self, accordingly, is a vacated, or ethically absented, being. Delivered
over to inevitability, selfhood is permanently experienced as something lost
to oneself (pp. 22-23). An excellent passage in Tucker's discussion of "Ulysses" puts this problem into relief: "As the memory of a desire thus shades
into the desire of a memory, the self that was and the self that would be divide between them the self that is" (p. 228). Yet this is Ulysses speaking. The
fate of Tennyson's Victorian speakers is still more doomed, for they have no
self that was, no history of their own, but only the substitote self of their
temporal inheritance: that is, they have only their doom, not at all the same
as an achieved self-history.
Tucker's word "doom" is a highly probable one for the overdetermined
sense of foreboding that besets the world of Tennyson's poems. In his discussion, the word has literary-historical as well as cultural resonance. The author's note that his book "argues for the thematic and strategic importance of
a highly literate Victorian poet's allusiveness, principally to Romanticism,"
suggests the influence of Harold Bloom, though without a full application of
Bloom's poetics of misprision. Tucker holds instead to an unspoken middle
ground which I should like to try to identify in terms more precise than "specifically literary biography."
Rather than posit a rivalry between Tennyson's poetic self and the Romantics, above all Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley, Tucker is concerned to tease
out of the texts Tennyson's non-agonistic use of the Romantic precedent. To
this extent his understanding of Tennyson's relation to the romantics is revisionary: a rereading in the act of weighing and pondering their use. It is an
approach which makes for judiciously subtle readings of Tennyson's "allusiveness," as in analyses of references to Alastor" in "Mariana in the
South," to the "Intimations Ode" and" Adonais" in "Ulysses," and to Keats's
odes nearly everywhere (pp. 142, 223-27, 236-38). Tucker thus sees Tennyson carrying on a critically reflexive turn in Romanticism itself: "It is not
eighteenth-century originalism but a critically reconstructive, Romantic
perspective on tradition that we find Tennyson adopting in 'Timbuctoo'" (p.
54). And on the same page we find that Tennyson, "having knowingly addressed Romantic themes on the Romantics' ground," must already have
been aware of the predetermined overfamiliarity of Victorian belatedness.
II
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This is a familiar gamut in the book. Whenever Tennyson's voice nears a past
or contemporary precedent, whenever he nears parody or echo, Tucker
argues for a self-conscious attitude in the poet, yet without saying what that
self-consciousness should mean to us or should achieve.
Ambiguity also crops up around the term "doom." Apparently, it is belatedness that defines the doom of Romanticism. But if this is what defines Romantic doom, it does not define it nearly enough. It does not tell us for example whether Romanticism's doom designates an epoch, an historical ending, or whether it designates an inherent characteristic of Romanticism;
whether, in other words, "the doom of Romanticism" is an objective or
subjective genitive. The question may be unanswerable, especially when one
considers that Romanticism has tended to define itself in terms of its own
frustratedness, in terms of a self-failing: what has not yet been cannot begin
to come to an end. But that is not the line on Romanticism that Tucker explicitly takes up: "reports on the death of Romanticism are as greatly exaggerated now as ever; and in any case literary history could imagine nothing
more Romantic than the demise of a cultural movement at the hands of a
single genius" (p. 29). Rather than answer the question, Tucker's statement
rephrases it in the terms of a self-historicizing Romanticism. As such, the
statement is indicative of a tendency in the book as a whole to finesse issues
of history, genre, and reception with elegant and paradoxical yet questionable utterances of a historical wisdom. Thus Tucker can write that "the gorgeously stunted growth of Tennyson's art, when exposed to the light of his
more capacious Romantic predecessors, is found wanting . .. but . .. the hot-

house beauties of the inbred Tennysonian imagination ... are found wanting
by Tennyson himself" (p. 134). Or again: "It has been objected that Tennyson's descriptions of nature sound too much like Victorian interior decoration; but this outdoor scene ... is so evidently filled with artificial furniture
that we may credit Tennyson with having raised the objection long before
the anti-Tennysonians did" (p. 156). And in his discussion of "The Gardener's Daughter" he writes, "The central picture is 'full and rich: as Tennyson
said, heavy with the inarticulate knowledge of doom that, mingling love and
death in the profoundest of earthly marriages, dwells in the body of the idyllic text" (p. 285). Although in this section Tucker is discussing the special
suitedness of the idyll as a means of escaping the "anxiety about time," the
point holds for Tennyson's work as a whole: the occupation of time as doom
is a means of escaping it (p. 287). So Tennyson continues a "Romantic poesis
[that] is never the construction of a new home from the ground up but always in part the occupation of an echOing haunt." Tennysonian affect remains most closely allied after all to the arrested temporality of the Keatsian
bower. But the question about the doom, whether it is the doom of or in Romanticism, remains unanswered because Tucker himself seems more intent

on describing rather than interpreting it.
Without questioning the truthfulness of any of Tucker's characterizations
of Tennyson, the reader may well wonder about the critical idiom of this
book. The adverbs "never" and "always" in the last quotation and the adjectives "profoundest" and "gorgeous" in statements quoted above are all designations of absoluteness, temporal or qualitative; and all partake in the same
overdetermined sense of tradition. The use of "gorgeous," strikingly frequent
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in this book, is perhaps the most significant, as it indicates the engorged and
engorging mood and temper of the Tennysonian subject. Tucker notes in various ways that many of Tennyson's speakers survive by engorging the very
time and situation which subjects them. That kind of indulgence, dramatizing
acceptance and submission as an act of will, reflects a deceptive reification of
psycho-social processes into impersonal and irresistible powers. The result is

loss on all fronts: personal, natural, social. (See the fine discussion of the
middie of "The Princess," pp. 361-67). The question, though, is whether this
critical idiom itself is not excessively determinpd by a representation of the
self, however bereft that self may be, as the locus of articulation. Here one
doubts the sufficiency of "specifically literary biography."
Yet Tucker himself suggests another approach to Tennyson's pervasive
sense of cultural doom. I have noted that Tucker does not execute Bloom's
antithetical criticism, even as he acknowledges a clear debt to Bloom. That is
for the good reason that Tucker is ultimately more concerned with the text as
cultural discourse than he is with the text as a means of staking poetic selfhood. This is most apparent from a number of passages in the last quarter of
the book where Tucker seems concerned with articulating for Tennyson's text
a hermeneutical rather than contestatory relation to the past. In these passages are some hints, albeit not registered in the notes, that Tucker has read
H.-G. Gadamer with a sense that Gadamer's work has a particular relevance
to Tennyson's situation. Significantly, it is in the conclusion of his discussion

of the idylls, the genre repressive of social context, and preparatory to his
discussion of the longer poems, where Tennyson is most explicitly the ideo-

logical subject of Victorian culture, that Tucker broaches the question of hermeneutic penetration and ideological critique (p. 345). In a tactful book,
Tucker tactfully does not bifurcate the two. He understands quite well the
logic of ideological imprisonment: "committing the alienated self to an accountable language means committing the self to the cultural world that language occupies and shapes" (p. 385; d. pp. 415, 421). Not a relaxation of
critical attentiveness, the hermeneutic mode points precisely to the problem
of belonging to and accepting a cultural discourse without merely repeating
it. It is the problem at stake for Tucker in the idylls, in "The Princess," "In
Memoriam," and "Maud," that is, in those texts in which the poet played out
most fully the role of a representative cultural voice. In this way the book
leaves off where it began, with the cultural pre-determination of Tennyson as
a Virgilian poet (pp. 28-30).
But here, too, difficulties arise. First, the question of hermeneutics and ide-

ology critique is left open, or hanging. Speaking of "The Princess," Tucker
cites "the fidelity of the text as a register of cultural suppositions shared
among a number of minds" (p. 371). This is a critical reflection that ought to
lead into a critical engagement, not one that can be left to stand by itself.
Second, does the doom of Romanticism ominously announced in the title not
tum out to be Romanticism's Victorian doom? a phase of its reception rather
than its closure? The meaning of the title is, more exactly, Victorian doom
and Tennyson's Romantic allusiveness. Looked at this way, Tucker's work is

eloquent testimony to the timeliness of redefining the relationship between
Romantic and Victorian.
These are prominent, even if residual, issues in a book meticulously well
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researched and written and which one is reluctant to fault. Tucker himself
may take them up again in future studies. If not, anyone who does will gratefully acknowledge a debt to this study.
The book is handsomely produced. Set in a generous and most legible
print, it also contains a comprehensive bibliography and an exhaustive and
reliable index. At a time when one routinely finds typos and printer's errors
in texts, I recall finding none here.

The University of Tulsa

John Jay Baker

The Historicity of Romantic Discourse by Clifford Siskin. New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. viii + 225. $24.95.
Clifford Siskin's bold and challenging new study of The Historicity of Romantic Discourse attempts nothing less than a new literary history of Romanticism. Rejecting traditional assumptions that literature is bound and defined
both by period-specific criteria and by common, identifiable themes and features, Siskin advances a definition of Romanticism that is grounded in a
theory of genre. The explanatory power accorded to genre is meant to free
his argument from institutional claims about both literature and history, and
to open an intellectual space for the analysis of Romantic-historical phenomena in a variety of discursive modes-including literary criticism-from the
eighteenth century down to the present. Drawing heavily upon Michel Foucault's theories of power and knowledge, and upon Ralph Cohen's theories
of literary history, Siskin provides a constructive literary historical analysis
that shows how Romantic discourse produces and authorizes the knowledge,
formal strategies, and value structures that constitute its durable power.
While so ambitious a project will inevitably encounter difficulties in some
areas (I will mention some of these momentarily), the overall accomplishment here is remarkable: Siskin is historically aware, politically sensitive, and
intellectually rigorous.
In what follows, I will provide a general descriptive sketch of the main
trajectory of Siskin's argument, following this with a brief discussion of issues that I believe bear further consideration. I want to stress, however, that
even as I suggest my differences with Siskin's argument, I do so from a position that recognizes and applauds the originality and importance of a study
that tries to conceptualize Romanticism from an entirely new direction.
Siskin's expository strategy follows two related lines of argument. First, he
exposes "the formal and conceptual limitations of different kinds of literary
histories" (p. 9)-from the traditional arguments of Abrams to the progressive ones of McGann-showing how these often distort both history and literature by taking as starting points certain explanatory categories and assumptions that themselves need to be explained. (For instance, most scholars
of Romanticism, past and present, tend to accept uncritically the Romantic
understanding of the autonomous subject, or of the redemptive powers of
nature, or of the transhistorical character of the creative imagination.) Second, in constructing his own explanation of Romanticism, he attempts to
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avoid the errors of other literary histories by turning from the traditional conceptual tools used to discuss Romanticism (e.g., he refuses the traditional definitions of literary periods) to "a classification system that avoids absolutes"
(p. 10). He finds this system in what he calls generic history, which "uses
genre to construct history rather than the other way around" (p. 10).
Genre possesses superior explanatory power, Siskin argues, because it
makes possible the investigation of texts both synchronically and diachronically; that is, it provides a means of studying texts both in tenns of change
and continuity, for it "categOrizes every text as a member both of an ongoing
kind and of a synchronically distinct set of relationships among different
kinds" (p. 20). According to this view, genre is not an essentialist or objective
category standing beyond the realm of investigation or explanation; rather it
rises "according to its increasing visibility in the changing hierarchies of all
other fonns of writing with which it is always related" (p. 10-11). Among
those other forms is criticism itself, which, according to Siskin, must also be
explained generically.
Siskin's argument divides into three broad sections, each devoted to a major conceptual category traditionally used to control discussions of Romanticism: Part I focuses on the concept of Lyric, Part II on the concept of Development, and Part III on the concept of Mind. Each of these categories, in
tum, is set within a frame of complementary concerns (present and past,
parts and wholes, desire and diScipline) that mark its specific discursivehistorical contours, and is then particularlized in terms of a variety of discursive forms. For example, lyric is examined in terms of its various expressions
from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries and at the same time set
within the context of the seemingly disparate powers of the imagination and
criticism; it is shown to rise in the generic hierarchy as seemingly disparate
discursive fonns (including literary criticism) take on lyric features. Development is presented as the means by which Romanticism makes sense of historical change, as it seems to suggest connections between various historical
threads and to point toward discernible and meaningful goals for human experience (e.g., the past is seen as a model for the present; innocence provides
hope for experience; the child is the father of the man). The invention of literature, the actual work of literature, and the power of nature all participate
in this developmental-teleological scheme. Finally, the Romantic mind is
shown to be a self-made region ripe for inquiry by the Romantic self. This
inquiry, in tum, functions as a kind of self-discipline as it invites ever-more
specialized intervention; the self-disciplinary nature of the mind's desire is
seen in such various areas as economics, sexuality, and addiction.
The constructive and unifying conceptual energy behind Siskin's critique of
these Romantic conventions and interests derives from the view that they are
all-whether features or experiences, verse or criticism-formal constructs,
which, within standard literary histories, are virtually always mistaken for
objective realities. When their formal character is fully understood we can
correct this mistaken assumption, which Siskin refers to as our Romantic addiction. This addiction, he argues, has trapped critical and historical studies
within a difficult, confining Romantic net, allowing us only to draw intellectual distinctions of degree within the parameters set down by Romanticism itself, never allowing us to draw distinctions of kind that might be capable of
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offering non-Romantic explanations of Romanticism and literary history.
Only by constructing a generic history of literature can we understand that
literature-and the discourses that would explain it-in culture-specific
terms.

The interventionist histOrical-political approach of Siskin's book is most
welcome at a time when many studies in Romanti~sm are turning enthusiastically toward non-historical language-based criticism and scholarship. At the
same time, however, his argument might give certain politically-minded critics pause, for its method and conclusions-despite their radical political vocabulary-might seem to run the risk of leaving everything just as it is. For
Siskin, the Romantic subject is suspect as a conceptual category and human
agency does not exist, at least not in the way it is usually conceived. Rather,
the human is subject to institutional control, to the institutional "gaze." Similarly, human desire-the utopian impulse seen in so much Romantic literature-is, in Siskin's analysis, most often presented as little more than a psychologizing of politics, as a product of limitation rather than an active energy
capable of directing social change. If this view is correct, then we must ask
what it means, not only for our understanding of the past, but also politically
and intellectually today for certain individuals and groups whose politics are
integrally connected to subject or identity construction and to utopian desire.
Does it mean that (say) blacks and women are hopelessly lost in Romantic
mystification when they construct group identities to unify radical political
movement? Does it mean that political movement is always and only formal
and discursive, never practical and human? If so, then what, other than our
conceptual categories and critical vocabulary, can be changed by our understanding of the historicity of Romantic discourse? In his conclusion, Siskin
remarks that he can offer no cure for our Romantic addictions, but that the
new literary history he proposes will enable us "to hear that tale [of
addiction] within Romantic discourse and thereby recognize that discourse's
ongoing power" (194). Certainly this is something. But we must ask whether
it is enough, or whether it is even all that is possible at this historical moment.
Several smaller items might be briefly noted. Siskin's prose at times is
quite turgid. Perhaps this is because the argument itself is complex, but nevertheless the difficulty of the prose often threatens to defeat even the most
sympathetic of readers. (Note, for instance, the sentence on p. 170, 23 lines
up, or the last sentence on p. 164.) The difficulty is exacerbated by numerous
grammatical errors (for instance, sentence fragments on pp. 34 and 180, dangling modifier on p. 84) and spelling errors (Charles Rzepka's name is consistently spelled incorrectly, pp. 8-9).
These qUibbles aside, Siskin's book is large, important, and thought-provoking. It radically re-situates literary historical studies in a way that challenges an entire range of primary concepts and features often associated with
Romanticism and Romantic texts-nature, creativity, imagination, organic
growth, and so on-attempting a positive, constructive literary history of
Romanticism that does not depend on essentialist or objectivist assumptions.
For this liberating effort, and for its unflinching critique of the formal-discursive strategies used in studying Romanticism, The Historicity of Romantic Discourse is likely to be discussed for a long time to come by both traditionalists
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and non-traditionalists. In unsettling the complacent and in providing a
model theory to spark new kinds of thinking and writing about Romanticism,
Siskin has contributed admirably to the study of Romanticism and to the
fields of discourse and genre theory.

Duquesne University

Daniel P. Watkins

Stealing the Language: The Emergence of Women's Poetry in America by Alicia
Suskin Ostriker. Boston: Beacon Press, 1986. Pp. 291. $19.95.
In the 1987 movie, Crossing Delancey, the character played by Amy Irving
passes in front of the upscale Greenwich Village bookstore where she works,
allowing the camera to linger for a moment on the shopwindow's glossy display of Alicia Suskin Ostriker's Stealing the Language. This unlikely cinematic
moment probably has its explanation in something like an Ostriker cousin in
the film industry, but it is somehow right. Crossing Delancey deflates the silliest pretensions of the New York literary crowd SO that Amy Irving, gnided by
her grandmother, can find true love. For its part, Stealing the Language eschews fashionable and dazzling theorizing about poetry in favor of passionate and intelligent readings of a body of poems. In both cases, the message is
that the ability to get beyond seductive flamboyance is rewarded with the
most enduring of pleasures.
Though Stealing the Language is unpretentious, it is a highly ambitious
work encompassing more than a hundred North American poets in its construction of a taxonomy of women's poetry in the United States (and, to a
lesser extent, Canada) since 1960. Ostriker's first chapter is a lucid short history spanning three centuries of poetry written by women in the United
States. The chapter effectively places the post-1960 poets who are the main
subject of Ostriker's study within a women's poetic tradition. While Ostriker
identifies the feminist movement as a crucial factor in the explosion of women's poetry since 1960, she suggests that it is possible to understand contemporary women's poetry only as the flowering of an already strongly rooted
plant. The tradition itself, however, is far from static; Ostriker presents it in
the context of the changing meanings of gender, womanhood, and poetry as
the United States changed from the agrarian colonial society in which Ann
Bradstreet wrote to the independent industrialized nation of the midtwentieth century.
According to Ostriker, the women's poetry movement born around 1960 is
centrally concerned with "the quest for autonomous self definition" against a
cultural past that has denied women's autonomy. Relying on feminist thinkers from Woolf and de Beauvoir to Adrienne Rich, Alice Walker, and Mary
Daly, as well as working with and within a growing body of feminist poetry
criticism (Homans, Juhasz and Lauter are three of the critics she invokes),
and more general feminist literary theory and criticism, Ostriker makes sense
of the explosion in poetry written by women in the United States in the last
thirty years. Each of Ostriker's chapters focuses on a key thematic issue in
the poetry: the quest for identity, writing (about) the body, anger and vio-
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lence, eroticism, and revisionist mythology. While formal issues are not ignored, they are inextricably bound to subject matter. Ostriker's abundant examples are drawn from the work of both well-known and lesser-known
poets, lesbian and heterosexual women, white women and women of color
(though she appears much more familiar with poetry by Black women than
she does with the work of Latina, Native American, or Asian American
poets). Ostriker never reads the more marginalized writers in terms of the
others, rather each of the voices contributes to Ostriker's nuanced and subtle
discussion.
Ostriker's second chapter, "Divided Selves: The Quest for Identity," discusses the need she sees expressed in contemporary American women's poetry to establish identity, and in her final chapter and epilogue she suggests
how that has begun to be achieved. In this poetry, the gendered body is a
critical factor in the establishment of identity. Chapter Three, "Body Language: The Release of Anatomy," examines contemporary women poets'
hard-won freedom to write openly about the female body both in celebratory
poetry claiming women's bodies as a source of power and in poems concerning women's physical vulnerability. It is in this section that Ostriker looks at
nature poetry, with particular reference to her poets' understanding of the
body's relation to the natural world. Interestingly, Ostriker takes up the issue
of eroticism not in this chapter, but rather later in the volume, under the title,
"The Imperative of Intimacy: Female Erotics, Female Poetics." Here she discusses poetry and pleasure as communication and connection, an erotics that
includes childbirth and motherhood as well as sexuality and the intimacy of
lovers, and a poetics that is, in Adrienne Rich's terms, "the drive to connect.
The dream of a common language" (quoted by Ostriker on p. 209). Ostriker's
chapter, "Herr God, Herr Lucifer: Anger, Violence, and Polarization," which
separates and connects her analyses of body and eraties, explores victimization writing as well as the articulation of violence. These poems of anger, Ostriker argues, do not offer either catharsis or resignation, but rather leave the
reader trapped in a painful, polarized position from which there is no escape.
Only in her final chapter, "Thieves of Language: Women Poets and Revisionist Mythology," does Ostriker suggest where escape might lie. By telling a
new story about women, using and transforming scraps gleaned from the old
ones, women poets in the United States have begun to envision a new way
of being in the world that embraces and contains the divided, fragmented
self.
Despite her title's echo of Claudine Herrmann's 1976 text, Les Voleuses de
langue, Ostriker's Stealing the Language is a quintessentially American study,
in the best tradition of U.S. feminist criticism. It is historically and politically
grounded, and it is practical. The thematic concerns that, in Ostriker's reading, are central to contemporary American women's poetry necessarily resonate beyond the texts themselves to a political feminism in which questions of
sexuality, violence, anger, identity and power derive from and speak to women's lived experience.
Ostriker is, unapologetically, an embodied reader and writer of poetry,
who assumes that other embodied women, reading and writing, also exist.
This is hardly a case of essentializing "woman," for in fact the diverse situations-the sites from which her poets write-emerge in her respectful, subtle
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readings. For Ostriker, however, the diversity of class, or sexual affinity, or
race, for example, does not negate the power of gender; and she affirms the
validity of the category of women's poetry, likening it, as a classification, to
"American poetry." Both, according to Ostriker, are categories that explain
rather than limit. Uke American poetry, women's poetry has, in her words, a
history and a terrain, and, she notes, "many of its practitioners believe it has
something like a language." Thus does Ostriker grant women's poetry its history and its geography while hedging on the thorny issue of a specifically
female language.
Ostriker's stated intention in this book is to attempt "to understand the
powerful collective voice in which [women poets] participate," to "gain
perspective on an emerging image, to describe a woman's equivalent of what
Whitman meant when he said he heard America singing in various voices
mysteriously united" (p. 8) and to answer the question "What happens when
'we who are writing women and strange monsters: in May Sarton's phrase,
begin to write with a freedom and boldness that no generation of women in
literary history has ever known?" (p. 8)
Ostriker succeeds admirably with a comprehensive study of great breadth,
generously laced with poems and poem fragments. Her primary method is to
juxtapose the texts of many different poets to develop a coherent analysis of
a particular subject matter. Equally successful, however, are her suggestive
(rather than exhaustive) readings of whole books of poetry, again within the
context of thematics. Ostriker's discussion of Sextun's The Jesus Papers in the
chapter on anger, violence and polarization, and of HD's Helen in Egypt in
the chapter on revisionist mythology, refer not only back on themselves as
enclosed texts, but outwardly, suggesting connections with the writing of
other poets. After reading Stealing the Language the attentive reader must
come away with the conviction that American women poets are not lone
voices speaking in isolation, but rather contribute to a rich body of work that
is further enriched by reading it in the context Ostriker elaborates. Alicia Suskin Ostriker takes us through the terrain of contemporary women's poetry in
the United States, so that once we have read her book, we see the landscape,
as well as the individual flowers, trees, and shrubs that are its components.
Ostriker is a poet herself, and her writing does justice to the poems she explicates and contextualizes. She does not try to upstage the poetry; she
writes, rather, with the maturity of a critic who is certain of her craft, which
makes this book a pleasure to read.

University of Minnesota

Amy Kaminsky

No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century by
Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar; Volume I: The War of the Words. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. 256. $22.95. Volume II: Sexchanges. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1989. Pp. xviii + 455. $29.95.
I remember walking down a tree-lined street in New Haven, between the
library and a small, set-back bookstore, when a fellow graduate student
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rushed up to me to announce that the first "feminist poetics" had arrived. No
longer would the French have a monopoly on discourses that addressed the
intersection of literary theory and gender. No longer would members of clandestine reading groups seek out unpublished manuscripts that made such
discourses available to those unfortunate few who only read English. No
longer would every seminar paper on feminist criticism require a rationale.
The year was 1979 and the "poetics" was Gilbert and Gubar's The Mad-

woman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary
Imagination.
Ten years later I find myself reviewing the first two volumes of the sequel
to that "poetics." Ten years is a long time to wait and a long time to sustain
the same project, especially in a field as transformational and transformed as
feminist criticism. Gone is the exhilaration and trepidation of the "first," perhaps because Gilbert and Gubar's edition of The Norton Anthology of Women
Writers: The Tradition in English has stolen the limelight. Perhaps because so
much of the material in No Man's Land is already familiar, having been published elsewhere. Perhaps because Shari Benstock's encyclopedic survey of
the modernist women (at least those who made it to Women of the Left Bank)
has already appeared (1986). It is not a sense of "belatedness" (the apprehension underlying Harold Bloom's theory of the "anxiety of influence") that
one is left with at the end of almost 800 pages. Rather, it is a sense that even
though the co-authors "had to rethink everything we had ever been taught
about twentieth-century literature," that rethinking does not include the category of Uterature nor the project of a literary history.
While The Madwoman in the Attic attempted to construct a distinctly female
literary tradition in the nineteenth century, No Man's Land focuses on the
"social, literary and linguistic interactions of men and women from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present." Gilbert and Gubar have abandonned both the (feminist literary critical) notion of a separate literary tradition and the (literary historical) notion of periodization strictly by century. Instead they have retained the spatial metaphor, substituting the figure of
female confinement and escape borrowed from Jane Eyre with a soldier's description of the trenches from World War l, subsequently borrowed as trope
by numerous writers. The self-division of the woman writer has been replaced by the war between the sexes. An internalized conflict between the
author and her enraged double has given way to the externalized conflict between an impotent and hostile "no-man" and an anxious because potent
New Woman over primacy in the literary marketplace. The pen, which was
once a metaphoric penis, has become a metaphoric pistol.
The first volume, The War of the Words, offers "an overview" of literary
production from 1850 to 1980 in the United States and England by means of
stories and poems which are read allegorically in order to reiterate ad infinitum the meta-story of the sexual battle. The second volume, Sexchanges, focuses on the period between 1880 and 1930 and analyses fewer texts in
greater detail, with entire chapters devoted to Kate Chopin, Edith Wharton
and Willa Cather. The assumption of the second volume draws on that of the
first: "the sexes battle because sex roles change, but, when the sexes battle,
sex itself (that is, eroticism) changes." Because the second volume treats "eccentric subjects" like "necrophilia, parthenogenesis and transvestism," and
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because some of its topics are not only "eccenhic but painful," such as imperialist xenophobia, lesbianism and the Great War, the authors feel the need to
include a disclaimer: "About such disturbing material, all we can finally say
is, Reader, we felt we had to write it, but please don't kill the messenger."
Still hearing the echoes of Bronte's heroine, it doesn't take long to realize
that the repressed double, not the Creole but the lesbian writer, has moved
out of the attic and into the closet.
The "anxiety of authorship" which named the conflict for nineteenth century women writers between accepting and rejecting a literary tradition based
on paternal authority in the absence of literary foremothers has been replaced by the "female affiliation complex." The source is still Freud ("Female
Sexuality"), the woman writer is still a literary daughter and her story is still
told as a family romance:

If we translate this model of female psychosexual development into a
map of literary paths, we can see that, whether the female artist turns
to what Freud would judge a normative renunciation of her desire for a
literary mother to the tradition of the father, whether in what Freud
might see as a frigid rejection of both allegiances she attempts to extricate herself altogether from her own aesthetic ambitions, or whether in
a move that Freud might define as "defiant" and "homosexual" she
claims the maternal tradition as her own, she has at last to struggle
with what we would provisionally define as a complicated female affiliation complex. (Vol. I, p. 168)

But given the fact that there is only one metastory, namely the batile of the
sexes, how many of these paths will be not just described, but valorized (using terms like "normative" and "homosexual")? In Freud's own words, the
three options are asexuality (the woman gives up on her "masculine proclivities" because boys are better at them), homosexuality (she forms a "masculinity complex" by refusing to give them up) and heterosexuality (the masculine is the love object rather than the source of identification). On the one
hand this set of relations between the feminine and the masculine is much
more complicated than the simple binarism of the batile. On the other hand,
given the metaphor of (hetero)sexual conflict (for Gilbert and Gubar as well
as for Freud) the only legitimate battle and/or sex is with men. On some
basic level, the two sets of paths are not even comparable, given that Freud
never mentions the maternal or the relations between women.
If the nineteenth century was characterized by a powerful father-daughter
paradigm, the twentieth is marked by "anxiety and exuberance" over finally
having, not a mother, but a choice of literary parentage. Literary foremothers
produce as much if not more ambivalence than fathers once did. Rather than
"influence" from outside, there is now a choice. And because there is a
choice, women writers can decide with whom to affiliate (although one cannot choose not to affiliate). And having chosen, they become linked (once
again) to a genealogy with its own "quasi-familial inevitability." Should one
choose the mother,
the literary daughter finds herself in a double bind. If she simply admires her aesthetic foremother, she is diminished by the originatory
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power she locates in that ancestress; but, if she struggles to attain the
power she identifies with the mother's autonomy, she must confront
... the peril of the mother's position in patriarchy, the loss of male
emotional approval paradoxically associated with male approbationas well as the intimacy with the mother that would accompany daughterly subordination. (Vol.!, p. 195)
In other words, the relation to the mother, and thus to other women, is not
the solution either. Although Gilbert and Gubar suggest that the "monolithic
pattern" of an earlier women's literary history has been displaced by a "variety of patterns," it is clear that the same patterns keep repeating themselves.
The one who wins the battle is the one who keeps it going longest and the
author who claims that distinction is Edith Wharton.
The chapter entitled"Angel of Devastation: Edith Wharton on the Arts of
the Enslaved" is truly exceptional. Like Gilbert and Gubar, Wharton addresses the same issues "book after book, story after story," namely "The
subject creature. The arts of the enslaved." In other words, she provides "a
feminist analysis of the construction of 'femininity.'" But presumably unlike
her co-critics, she repudiated both the "bonds of sisterhood" (of a woman's
separate sphere) and the "shoulder to shoulder feminist solidarity" (adopted
by the New Woman). Instead, she was nicknamed "John" and expressed
more concern for what she would wear than for what she had written before
her first meeting with Henry James. What distinguishes this chapter is that
contradiction has replaced dualism, a search for "Herland" (the utopian alternative to "No Man's Land") has given way to an analysis of patriarchal gender formations (at least for the leisure class of the Gilded Age) and revealing
social ills is seen as a separate enterprise from curing them. Wharton was not
a feminist but she can be read as offering a feminist analysis of gender relations which ultimately indicts men for the formation and perpetuation of the
leisure class. In spite or because of her "ferocious irony" she offers no alternative for the feminine except" contact with the stronger masculine individuality." She was both a "man's woman" and a "self-made man" and within
that contradiction one finds the most complex rendition of "sexchanges," not
as redemption but as critique.
At the same time Wharton's depiction of sexual arrangements can do nothing but repeat itself, finding variations only in the multitudinous character
formations and plot structures of her novels and short stories. Because there
is no solution, the battle must go on: "For though this writer was never consciously to align herself with the female camp in the battle of the sexes, her
secret feelings toward men, even toward men she loved, were often, and not
surprisingly, at least subtly hostile." This statement makes explicit the fundamental paradox of patriarchal gender relations and thus of Gilbert and Gubar's argument. Uke the plot of a popular romance, the point is not to avoid
or settle the dispute but to keep it going in the name of love for the purpose
of marriage. What makes Wharton additionally attractive is that female rage
once again undergoes repression and reappears in the subtext, in this case,
the ghost story. There Wharton can safely imagine turning on her master by
portraying the erotically illicit.
A simllar attempt to rewrite eroticism on the part of lesbian writers en-
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counters a quite different critical reception. Even though the chapter "'She
Meant What I Said': Lesbian Double Talk" ends with the statement that its
subject matter has been the "first, fully self-conscious generation of lesbian
writers," the authors nevertheless choose as their analytic categories the
loneliness of the lesbian in heterosexual society and thus of the lesbian writer
in literary history, an aesthetic of mutuality or "double talk" that can tum
collaboration into collusion, and a principle of pain which seems to persist in
same-sex relations, primarily because these relationships so isolate the lovers
that each one must constantly fear the loss of a separate identity. ''Perpetual,
ontological expatriation" becomes the plight of those who live in the "supposedly native land which is heterosexuality." The real danger is not the "no
man's land of sex" but the attempt on the part of any woman writer to create
"her own land" and thus put into question not only the "female affiliation
complex," but the very notion of a literary history: "In their attempts to write
new and strange words that evade the territorial battles between literary men
and women, the lesbian expatriates looked back to an ancient, almost mythic
literary history or forward to the total annihilation of literary history." In
either case, not to the kind of literary history that Gilbert and Gubar want to
construct. Here the chief offender is Gertrude Stein.
The reading of Stein is the least successful in the entire two volumes. At
one point the co-critics go so far as to begin a paragraph: "While a number of
readers have felt victimized by Stein's impenetrable sentences or resentful
about their failure to makes sense of her nonsense, even the responses of her
admirers identify her authorial audacity with male mastery." (A footnote corroborating the first point of view refers the reader to a male critic whose
book appeared in 1958). Certainly Gilbert and Gubar include themselves
among "a number of readers" and their main complaint about Stein has to
do with the fact that she created ''her own land," put herself at its center and
from there engaged in a "self-authorizing aesthetics" that exploited not only
Alice, but continues to exploit us as readers. Neither a utopian "Herland" nor
a battle of the sexes, Alice Simply cannot be portrayed as the enraged but repressed dark double of Gertrude nor can Gertrude be described as an anxious
and thus hostile "no-man." Instead (in Gilbert and Gubar's emplotment) Alice becomes the author of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas which she
gives to Gertrude as a subversive gift by producing the only readable Stein.
Since even Gilbert and Gubar complain that Stein herself is always the
central focus of any treatment of her work, it might be useful to consider
what the stakes are, besides lifestyle. Worse than being manly in the most
mascutinist way, Stein puts into question three fundamental principles underlying the project of No Man's Land: she refuses predecessors, thus rejecting the "female affiliation complex"; she engages in an "aesthetics of solipsism," thus undermining the very notion of literature; and she tums collaboration into collusion, thus challenging the premises of co-authorship ("We
feel this book is fully collaborative," Gilbert and Gubar write in their introduction). Paraphrasing their own words: Stein claims all literary history as
her own; she refuses to produce representational works; she rejects the notion of revision; and she creates only for herself. What could be more frustrating, more anxiety-provoking, more antithetical for two critics who want to
create their own (definitive) literary history based on representational works
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required to substantiate a meta-story, having done so for over ten years in
the hope of reaching the entire community of literary critics? Stein's worst
crime is that she turns words into weapons, not against men, but against
women readers, and not because her topics might be "eccentric and painful,"
but because there are none that lend themselves to recuperation by Gilbert
and Gubar's history. Her textual/sexual strategies make us rethink everything, not just "twentieth century literature."
From Freud's point of view (according to Gilbert and Gubar) "the 'masculinity complex' could be carried no further." For Gilbert and Gubar, "The father had been turned into a fat-her" (based on the insights of six year old
Molly Gubar). Perhaps an even more fundamental anxiety lies at the heart of
their project, a fear of the female body which in its "excess" usurps the position of the father and/or abuses the role of the mother. In an otherwise interesting and provocative discussion of Olive Schreiner's The Story of an African
Farm, one finds the following statement: "If Tant' Sannie is the only mother
figure on the farm, we can understand the dilemma she poses by crystallizing
it into the sentence, There is no mother and she is huge." Both of these sentences, in their aphoristic brevity, in their focus on fatness, in their concern
with the parental, point to issues that can't be dealt with Simply by including
a chapter on lesbian writers or by suggesting that daughters can choose with
whom to affiliate. They reflect an unquestioning attachment to the family
romance, to Freudian discourses on sexuality, and to quotable quips. What,
then, one might ask, has feminism done for anyone besides the publishing
industry?
The point is not to reveal and revel in the unexplored anxieties of Gilbert
and Gubar. The point is that a feminist criticism which thought that the
daughter would be better off having a choice of parentage than an "anxiety
of no-authorship," must eventually recognize that some choices are more
valued than others and that choosing peaceful co-existence with a woman
can be more threatening than engaging in battle with a man. More importantly, the privileging of analytic paradigms like the "battle of the sexes" not
only laments but produces forms of epistemic violence by categorically excluding lesbian writers who can then only be included as nostalgiC, lonely
expatriates. The move from the attic to a "no man's land" has proven perhaps more advantageous for the modern woman writer than for the feminist
literary critic. The fact that there are no men or men with "no-manhood"
means that there might be women who embody those attributes once
thought to be inherently masculine.

The University of Michigan

Anne Herrmann
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Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory by Barbara
Herrnstein Smith. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. 229.
$22.50.
History and Value: The Clarendon Lectures and Northcliffe Lectures 1987 by
Frank Kermode. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988. Pp. viii + 150. $29.95.
Revising the canon: who's in, who's out, on what grounds, and how long
will today's judgment last? The debate is extensive and often heated. "We

must save the young from the prejudices of the past"-or, with equal urgency, "We must pass on to our children the values that enabled us to survive." Who's right? Who's wrong? Who knows?
One thing, however, is sure: this discussion, which sounds so contempo-

rary, is not new. Frank Kermode is also struck by a sense of deja vu. In the
two series of lectures gathered in History and Value, he approaches the modem problem of canon revision by way of a review of the fiction he read as a
student in the thirties. The terms then were "art" and "propaganda," but the
notes of that discussion echo in today's-can artistic form ever be decoupled
from the socio-political point of view of the artist? Kermode wonders how
well the deliberately proletarian fictions of the thirties hold up after fifty
years and whether or not a look back at them will yield any guidelines for
distinguishing good literature from bad-for fonning a new canon. As befitting the lecture mode, Kermode's method and tone are discursive and anec-

dotal, and the book in general is a pleasure to read.
Barbara Herrnstein Smith's monograph, on the other hand, is a strictly academic affair. It brims with the jargon of modem criticism as she argues subtle
philosophical distinctions. Though far less fun, Contingencies of Value, however, is a much more helpful guide to the aesthetic problems at the root of
the contemporary debate. Finally, though good and wise things are said in
both books, the reader should come to neither expecting anything remotely
resembling a list of literature's saints.
What is so scary about revising the roster of Great Books? I suspect that
much of the anxiety comes from a perception that what is happening in academia today is different from revisions of the past. Reference is no longer
made to "permanent human truths" that explain our interest in the productions of past ages. Instead additions and deletions are made with an apparently whimsical democracy. Evaluations are blown by the winds of politics.
As a result, my straw objector seems to feel, students may no longer be compelled to read Shakespeare and Keats and Joyce; instead they'll be handed
second-rate, third world authors selected to give racial or sexual balance to a

curriculum. No longer are we allowed to say one piece of writing is better
than another. Art, Truth, and Morality will fall (if they haven't already) to
the pure relativism of "my ideas are just as good as your ideas." Civilization

is doomed. My straw objector may have an overly simple mind, but the argument is recognizeable, and perhaps in some of its elements even supportable.
According to Smith, however, there are several flaws in this reasoning.

First, although permanent human truth may no longer be a viable idea (and
I'll come back to that), it does not follow that evaluation no longer takes
place. It does. Second, even without a universal, objective standard, evalua-
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tion is not merely relative. (The operative word here is "merely," which implies whimsy.) There is a way between the rocks of absolutism and frivolity,
if we take as a guide the metaphor of relativity. In science, relativity means
there is no absolute rest (or standard) against which to measure something.
Space and time are not finnly fixed aspects of the universe; rather they are
dependent upon the observer's perspective on natural phenomena. The most
familiar example of this comes from the subatomic world in which either the
position or the velocity of an electron can be measured accurately, but not
both: the process of measuring one inevitably changes the other. Criteria and
perspective, then, are as important as the measurement itself, because they
are the limiting factors. Moreover, one never really knows where a particular
electron is, no matter how well it is measured. One only knows where the
electron has a high probability of being. Similarly, physicists have found that
electrons are either particles or waves depending upon the criteria an observer uses to measure them. Questions like 'what are electrons really?' don't
make sense. The certainty of Aristotelean causality has been replaced by the
uncertainty of probability. Undeniably, twentieth century physics has produced a paradigm of the world that is less comfortable-at least until we get
used to it-than the world of Newtonian mechanics (which, we should not
forget, was a new shoe at one time too).
The concept of relativity has provided philosophers as well as literary critics with a metaphor to describe a world whose diversity is becoming more
and more apparent. Our growing awareness of different cultures and points
of view has brought with it a skepticism about making rigid pronouncements
of ethical or artistic value. As a resuit, our belief in the existence of some absolute transcendent truth or objective standard against which to measure or
evaluate human experience has evaporated. Platonic ideas of Art or Truthor anything else-simply don't appear to exist. Alas. We may mourn their
loss, but it's just not possible to regain the confldent old Eden.
Thus we have come to the contemporary idea that truth-like the real nature of the electron-is relative. Evaluations of truth-of artistic merit, moral
or political rectitude, what have you-are made not according to some absolute standard (what, after all, might that be?) but relative to the position,
perspective, and need of the observer. Quite simply, Smith asserts that evaluation is not done in a vacuum (it never was). Evaluation is always done BY a
particular human being FOR a particular end. To evaluate the evaluation,
then, we must identify who is making it and why.
If I understand Smith correctly, she is arguing here for a more seIfconscious kind of criticism, one that explicitly defines the criteria upon which
its evaluations are based. This is not a particularly easy task, nor is it freed
from potential complaints that someone's criteria are simply rationalizations
of a different cultural prejudice. Yet the point remains: we need to know
what we are doing and why, and we should ask the same of others. What is
this evaluation for? If we are revising the academic curriculum to reflect a
broader political point of view, that's alright. But we ought to understand
that that's what we are doing and not confuse the issue by asserting that this
revision will thereby produce a better curriculum. Better in what sense? Is it
possible to say artistically better? That is the particular mire the Marxian critics had difficulty skirting in the thirties. They desperately wanted artistic
merit and political correctness to be synonymous. But they're not.
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And so someone-a group, you, me-begins to make a list of things people should read, of things students should read. Call it, if you will, "the canon"-but remember it is just a collection of literary examples-not holy texts
-that we as a group want to share because they speak to us-somehow.
And this, of course, is where things get difficult. Why does one piece of literature speak to us? What is it we want to share? Answers will probably be
couched in terms of how the poem or novel or play says what it says. Form
and theme. Art and politics. Who really wants to make one aspect of literature more important than the other? Both are essential.
And this brings me right back to the metaphor of relativity: the space and
time of literature are, if you will, politics and art. When a critic evaluates a
poem in terms of its (political) message, aesthetics tends to shift out of focus.
When the evaluation is made solely in aesthetic terms, the message of the
poem recedes. It is difficult, if not impossible, to look at both simultaneously
and with equal emphasis. The form and the message of literature are connected, but not, unfortunately, by means of simple cause and effect. It just
doesn't work to equate artistic merit with political "correctness"-nor, for
that matter, political merit with artistic quality. The medium both is and is
not the message-at the same time. Oeariy, intellectual life-like subatomic
physics-is complicated and uncomfortable.
Smith and Kermode agree that all evaluations of art, and other experiences,
take place within a context of history. This means the evaluator (the critic) is
located in a particular pOSition in space and time. There is nothing too astonishing about this assertion. It has been repeatedly shown that human values
are a product of culture and that different cultures are likely to display different values.
Problems arise, however, when we begin to recognize that human culture
is not homogeneous. Even Western Culture itself is far from homogeneous:
there are within the western tradition all sorts of variations based on race,
gender, class, nationality, religion, and on and on. As a result evaluators are
going to come up with different evaluations. And as we move in our understanding towards individualized criteria, goals, and perspectives, evaluation
will more and more resemble personal prejudice. Does this then mean that
ultimately all evaluation is reduceable to prejudice?
If I have any criticism of Smith, it is that she spends much too much energy arguing the necessarily limited quality of all human descriptions of experience and too little discussing the rather crucial question of how then do
we evaluate something objectively-be it literature, art, or scientific theoryfrom within that necessarily limited and subjective perspective. That evaluations do take place, and should take place, she has no doubt-nor do I. She
is also clear that evaluations themselves are never pure and transcendent,
that evaluations are always for something. This latter point is quite right, and
needs to be remembered. We evaluate and select texts for a class to demonstrate some property or idea students need for doing or knowing something.
We select movies for a series for a particular audience. Evaluations, in other
words, always have within them implicit goals. However, all of this leaves us
with no very good way to validate various evaluations. Given the lack of an
absolute standard, it is still necessary to winnow good evaluations from the
bad. The only thing we're offered by Smith is that a good evaluation will
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some how "work better" or "fit the criteria better" than a bad one. I, for one,
find this explanation not very satisfactory.
Perhaps another tack could be taken, along lines laid out by psychoanalysis. Cranted, it is both intellectually and culturally honest to identify the criteria upon which one's evaluation is based; moreover to do so also improves
the evaluation. According to psychoanalytic theory, disorders can be overcome when their unconscious or subconscious roots are exposed, for one cannot deal with something until it is recognized and understood. Would it not
be fair to say that subjectivity and its attendant prejudice can be overcome by
a similar process? Only by understanding our personal and cultural limitations and by explicitly articulating our criteria and goals of judgment can we
open the possibility of a truly objective evaluation. Thus, we might validate
an evaluation by assessing the completeness of the criteria upon which it is
explicitly based. Certainly I can see where this process would be enormously
useful in assessing evaluations that make assertions like "classical music is
better than rock" or "classical Creek literature is better than Latin American." For what? On what grounds?
Such a paradigm for the process of evaluation suggests that indeed some
evaluations are legitimate and others are not. I am not a better human being
than you-what, after all, could be the criteria for that statement? However, I
may be a better gardener-my tomatoes are bigger; my roses are free from
black spot. Similarly it is impossible to say whether tragedy or comedy is better drama (on what grounds?), but Shakespeare is a better dramatist than
Marlowe (plotting, character development, imagery, thematic complexity). I
gather that is what Smith is talking about when she says there is no transcendent value (qua human being, qua music) but only relative values (for
something, from a perspective). And what this means is that we become a lot
more self-conscious about our assumptions. Although we cannot avoid the
fences of cultural limitation, we can at least recognize them and thus see over
them.
All of this has a great deal to do with revision of the so-called canon. Neither Smith nor Kermode would do away with the canon. Nor would most
other critics, even the most radical of revisers. A set of books or authors commonly considered important voices for the culture is both useful and necessary. It is, remarks Kermode, a primary tool for making sense of our history.
We've come a long way from Matthew Arnold and his touchstones. Arnold,
of course, was the product of a small but dominant intellectual elite in England, who all more or less agreed on what they liked: it was not necessary to
justify their choices to those who spoke, as it were, an entirely different language. Such homogeneity does not exist in America at the end of the twentieth century. Moreover, we are increasingly aware of the diversity of artistic
production throughout the world, each creation stuck in some time and in
some place, reflecting different values, using different techniques. Comparing
diverse artistic productions can be like comparing apples and pears. One
must be self-conscious about setting criteria. Note, this is not the same thing
as saying, that there aren't good apples and bad apples. There are fresh apples suitable for pie and rotten ones (bad pie apples) suitable for compost.
One does not make pie out of compost, although compost is a very helpful
kind of mulch. We must get better about definlng the categories. We ought
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not to be wasting energy asserting that Melville is better than Kate Chopin,
unless we can state the criteria relative to which we are working. This is the
important lesson of Smith.
Kermode's discussion of literature in the 1930s complements this lesson
nicely. He offers a demonstration of the transience of criteria and thus of all
evaluations. The political and artistic agendas of the Marxian realists no
longer stimulate passionate argument. Many of the novels read with enthusiasm by another generation as illustrations of proletarian art have lost their
glow. Those criteria of value have been forgotten or no longer interest us.
Other novels, however, still do move us. Why, Kermode wonders? Are these
novels sifted out by time better novels? Why didn't they appear to be at first?
he there criteria that will winnow the fiction that will last from the passing
fancy? For after all, isn't that what we want when building a canon? Something stable and lasting. Such an effort strikes an immediate chord of sympathy, of course; that is what we want-a standard in the midst of flux. But is it
possible? It is useful here to remember Einstein, the father of relativity yet a
man who could not find it in his soul to give up causality. It is difficult to
accede emotionally to a major paradigm change, even as one fully understands it intellectually.
Kermode makes a stab at a solution, but he is not successful. Lasting has
something, if not a lot, to do with luck, he says (that's the new man speaking), but it also has something to do with permanent human values (the old
man speaks). How I wish there were permanent human values, and that Kermode could define them. But he can't. (Could Joseph Campbell, perhaps?)
Kermode does make various suggestions: works that "surprise by their own
complexity, and by the force with which they violate commonplace perceptions"; works about "a struggle across the frontier"i works that "break the
social order." But this won't do anymore, and I suspect Kermode knows it,
for the argument is not pursued. Though he may have found some useful
generalizations about the thematic interests of certain kinds of fiction, this
does not justify turning deSCriptors into universal imperatives.
Which brings us back to an unresolved problem. Why does the whole discussion of evaluation feel fruitless? Because, I think, we cannot step out of
history to make evaluations. The only help comes from understanding the
process, articulating the relationships among factors, and figuring out what is
relative to what.
The canon is our link with the past. But the books we consider necessary
today are different from those valued by the Greeks, by the Elizabethans, or
even by our grandparents. There are overlaps, of course, which is as it should
be. The list is also constantly being revised, just as we constantly revise the
stories we tell abou~ our own histories. The canon is a paradigm of our literature. It is how we understand our history; it is what we want to pass on,
what we want to remember. It should change as our und~rstanding of ourselves and our history changes. But, as Kermode remarks, it should also not
change too fast. The link must be maintained or we will lose who we are.
Politics and concepts of art do influence evaluation, but politics and art too
are the products of limited human perspectives.
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.

Linda Howe
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Where the Meanings Are is about feminism and culture, and particularly
about the relationship between sexual politics and writing as it has developed
in the course of the last two decades. Catharine Stimpson identifies feminism
as a space, a place of questioning and questing, of tracing, challenging, and
making meanings, a place of plurality, debates, and reconciliations. Feminism
is thus not univocal: the feminist cultural consensus, Stimpson acknowledges,
has fallen apart and is now beyond restoration. But difference ("herterogeneity," she calls it) is cause for celebration, not regret: feminism can well live
with fragmentation. Stimpson enters into the current debates in feminist criticism without acrimony and without anxiety. Anyone who is satisfied with
rigid distinctions between French poststructuralist feminism on the one hand,
and homogeneous Anglo-American humanist feminism on the other, would
do well to read this book, which crosses those boundaries with ease.
But for Stimpson feminism is more than a series of topics for discussion. It
is also, and very clearly, a sharply defined project. Her declared sexualcultural politics is a commitment to defining the restrictions which operate
against women, probing women's resistances to oppression, and reconstructing the world of meanings to include women and women's interests.
Some of the feminist debates of the last two decades, and the corresponding developments in theory and practice, are either inscribed or recorded in
Where the Meanings Are. The first of these essays was Originally published in
1970 and, as the author herself disarmingly points out in her introduction, it
uses the generic he. Stimpson does not change the pronouns for republication. I wondered about this: what would I have done? would I have reproduced my own he-man language of those days? I might not have had the
nerve ... But I am so glad that Stimpson has left her essay as it was originally written. It is important, after all, to remind ourselves of how far we
have come. Kate Millett and Germaine Greer also took masculine pronouns
for granted in 1970; most of us didn't think twice about them in those days;
and now we flinch. That change is a tribute to the achievement of feminism
in installing women in everyday language.
On the other hand, this first essay, "Black Culture/ White Teacher," nearly
twenty years old now, is a good deal more than a historical curiosity. I outraged a liberal British audience very recently by registering a similar unease
about "teaching" Black writing as a white academic. Was I criticising my audience's well-intentioned efforts to share the Black experience? Or merely
uncertain about a concept of reading and writing which saw truth to experience as recoverable? Or is there a more important question of voice herel a
problem of who is speaking, and for whom? Wisely, Stimpson concludes that
if white teachers must continue to help to present Black literature, for regrettable numerical reasons (reasons which still obtain now, in Britain, at least),
we should teach it otherwise surrendering some of the teacherls conventional
authOrity.
Such wisdom is a recurrent characteristic of this book. In the course of the
essays Stimpson brings it to bear on Shakespeare, on cultural history, on the
theory and practice of teaching Women's Studies, on androgyny and homol

Criticism, Vol. XXXI, No.4: Book Reviews

519

sexuality, the company of children ... And every time her reader is invited
to share the sense of thoughtful reflection on real and important issues.
Among these issues two recur consistently in the essays. How should
women read? How should we write? These are the questions which, whether
explicitly or implicitly, have dominated feminist criticism for the last twenty
years. They are also questions which haunted Virginia Woolf, and others before her. And if they are not finally resolved after all this time, that is testimony to the vitality of feminism, which moves to take account of the
changes it is partially responsible for bringing about. While the reciprocal
meanings of man and woman continue to shift as an effect of feminist debates
and conservative reaction, feminist criticism needs to go on developing new
anaiyses, new styles, new modes of address.
Stimpson's own reading practice is acute, focused and concise. Commenting on Shirley, she writes: "Charlotte Bronte deconstructs patriarchal religion,
a phallic dominance of politics and the economy, constrictions on female autonomy and work, a sexual double standard, the sufferings of a displaced
working class. Yet, even her hatred of deprivation, even her analysis of the
interlocking systems of class and gender, cannot generate a revolutionary
narrative..... Her narrative closes in a double marriage and a brooding elegy for the nature, mystery, and magic that industrialism has erased" (p.
158). This sharp account occurs in the course of an essay about reading, "Female Insubordination and the Text," first published in 1986. Stimpson understands feminist reading as an active process, a matter of picking up signals,
selecting, dwelling on the enabling characteristics of the text, recognising its
analysis of patriarchy, without necessarily ignoring the limitations of the liberalism which confines a novel to elegy where we might hope for revolution.
She is in consequence a generous reader herself, as she demonstrates again
and again, and particularly in a detailed account of the poetry of Adrienne
Rich. Stimpson draws the line only at anti-feminist women: Midge Deeter is
accused of having written "a feisty, yet snivelling, little polemiC," The New
Chastity and Other Arguments Against Women's Liberation (p. 186). I haven't
read it, but in view of the title, I'm with Stimpson.
Reading, she argues, matters. The active nature of the process enhances the
reader's sense of power. Reading can be a kind of guetrilla warfare, a raiding
of the text for materials, empathy or anger, to motivate and define the necessary reconstruction of our own culture: "Reading women will secretly school
themselves in the tactics of disobedience" (p. 159). And this process in turn
intensifies the reader's sense of her own strength.
Reading is always a political act, rooted in resistance to women's oppression, but also in reconciliation with the readings of other feminists. "Feminism and Feminist Criticism" engages with the issue of gynocritics, the quest
for women's writing. Sceptical about basing political analysis on anatomy,
Stimpson also doubts the existence of a permanent, repressed female being,
especially if the utterances attributed to the eternal feminine can be shown to
reaffirm patriarchal myths of women as primitive, irrational, babbling creatures. None the less, her proposal in this essay is precisely that we should
find out, that we should pursue the quest for women's writing, and analyse it
to see what in it, if anything, is permanent, and permanently different. At
worst, we shall have laid a myth to rest; at best, we shall release into our cul-
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ture what it has rendered marginal, and so transform the culture itself in unforeseen ways.
These essays about women reading are also/ therefore, about women writ-

ing. Here too the emphasis is on difference: women do not all write in the
same way. But Stimpson finds that women's writing tends to have in common a play between subordination and insubordination, an invocation of formal and narrative strategies that at once reveal and conceal women's seHassertions in language. Not all women's writing is feminist: sometimes subordination is simply dominant; sometimes initial rebellion gives way to despair.
But Stimpson also locates instances of radical writing by women who refuse
to accept the place their culture has allotted them. What characterises their
work is, she unexpectedly concludes, not only a political commitment, but a
willingness to take risks-and the patience that effective rebellion requires.
Her own writing changes in the course of the book, tracing once again the
history of its production. The early essays are more transparent, more evi-

dently well constructed. And yet even in the fIrst of them marginality is inscribed in the form, as italicized passages of personal, experiential narrative
and reflection intercept the rational argument. Later the prose becomes more
allusive, more inclined to foreground the device, more condensed. But it is

never impenetrable, always pleasurable. Abstraction alternates with the concrete, theory with wit. In "Nancy Reagan Wears a Hat" Stimpson, who
knows all about it, follows an account of the poststructuralist interrogation of
signifying practice and the conscious subject with a deScription of a Koren
cartoon from the New Yorker. A little girl at her birthday tea, surrounded by
friends and family sighs with pleasure.'Tm about to experience the totality of
who I am," she exclaims. "Poor Birthday Princess," comments Stimpson.
"For what if her identity were not such a piece of cake?" (p. 190).
With increasing self-consciousness about its mode of address one current
t

of feminist writing tends to inhabit the stylistic spaces defIned by tradition,
but to occupy them differently. In this way it refuses to take the place of patriarchy, but instead displaces it, drawing attention by its own breaches of
convention to the relentless linearity and conclusiveness of patriarchal forms.
Stimpson's recent style is frequently lyrical, often unexpected, sometimes disarmingly honest, not afraid to be vuinerable, economic, pointed, and never,
never magisterial.

The essay on Adrienne Rich concludes with a meditation on writing:
Language lies. Language invents. Poetry lies. Poetry invents. Rich accepts that "truth." Writing tells stories that matter. Writing gives us images from the mind and of the body, for the relief of the body and the
reconstruction of the mind. Rich accepts that "truth" as well. If some
words ("lesbian") constrict the throat, say them. Open them up. Only
then can we speak enough to wonder seriously if language lies, because it is language; if language invents, because it is language; or if
language lies because people are liars who invent to control, rather
than to dream, and justly please. (pp. 153-4)
Language offers endless possibilities of invention, of pleasure. Colloquialism
and popular journalism, as well as poetry, demonstrate the delight of linguis-
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tic transgression, until creativity stales into cliche and impels renewed inventiveness. Language is in this sense always a space to be inhabited otherwise,
from the margins. But for exactly this reason we need to distinguish between
those who invent in order to coerce, and those who do so to release new
meanings, new possibilities, new ways to be. Stimpson-and feminismhave made their choices clear.
After the essays, the next best thing about Where the Meanings Are is the
jacket photograph of Catharine Stimpson in a silk dress in front of a mountain. She is evidently having a good time. The mountain is only marginally
taller and thus more impressive than the woman-but then she is relaxed
and leaning on one elbow.
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